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SUMMARY 
The Report is concerned with the regulation of nuclear safety. 
This Document (Part 1 of the Report) draws upon experience in 
Western European countries, internationally recognised good 
practices in nuclear safety, and the Safety Fundamentals 
identified by the Nuclear Safety Standards Advisory Group (NUSSAG) 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (!AEA). It examines the 
objectives of an effective nuclear safety regulatory regime, the 
requirements that it should meet, and the arrangements for their 
achievement. Developed by a Task Force of the Regulatory 
Assistance Management Group of the CEC, it is intended as a source 
of guidance to those at the senior governmental and regulatory 
level in countries operating nuclear 
particularly where such arrangements 
introduced or strengthened. 
are 
power programmes, 
currently being 
The legislative and administrative provisions for implementing the 
regulatory process are examined. Criteria upon which an effective 
regulative regime should be based, including the clear separation 
of regulatory and operating responsibilities, are summarised. The 
concept of the 'regulatory organisation' is discussed and its 
terms of reference and responsibilities reviewed, together with 
the supportive arrangements necessary for it to carry out its 
licensing, assessment, inspection and enforcement activities 
effectively. 
The functions of the regulatory organisation are reviewed, 
including the need to develop regulatory policy and guidance, 
establish rules, codes of practice and assessment criteria, and 
ensure the provision of adequate emergency response arrangements. 
Guidance is provided on its organisational structure and staffing, 
the provision of adequate resources needed for it to function 
effectively, and access to expert technical and nuclear safety 
policy advice. 
The various stages in the licensing process, from initial design 
to completion of decommissioning, are examined. The concept of 
licensing and the purpose of the nuclear licence are discussed. 
Guidance is given on the attachment of conditions and constraints 
- Ill -
to the licence in the interests of safety, and on additional 
controls that may need to be imposed from time to time for 
regulating the safe operation of an installation. 
The role of regulatory assessment of the operator's safety 
submissions in the initial licensing process and throughout the 
life of a nuclear installation is reviewed. Assessment objectives 
and procedures are outlined, together with guidance on the 
information that should be provided to the regulatory organisation 
so that it can satisfy itself that its safety requirements have 
been met. 
Inspection is an important element in verifying compliance with 
regulatory requirements, including licence conditions. Inspection 
arrangements, including the deployment of inspectors and the 
development of inspection programmes and guide-lines, are 
discussed. The duties of regulatory inspectors are reviewed, 
together with procedures for providing a graded response to any 
non-compliance of regulatory requirements, investigating safety 
related incidents, and implementing compliance and enforcement 
arrangements. 
Provisions for maintaining regulatory effectiveness over the 
longer term are considered. The importance of establishing 
effective liaison arrangements between the regulatory organisation 
and other relevant bodies, including the operating organisation, 
the media and the public is emphasised. The need for a structured 
programme of on-going staff training, and for participation in the 
work of relevant international and inter-governmental 
organisations, is also stressed. 
For completeness, the Report summarises the responsibilities of 
the operating organisation for complying with licensing 
requirements and meeting its operational safety commitments. 
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ESTABLISHING AN EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR SAFETY REGULATORY REGIME 
PART 1 - OBJECTIVES AND REQUIREMENTS 
FOREWORD 
Recent years have seen an increasing emphasis at the inter-
governmental and international level on identifying' the nuclear 
safety objectives and principles that should provide the 
foundation of national arrangements for the safe regulation of 
nuclear installations. The importance of ensuring a legally 
based, independent, technically strong regulatory authority for 
the effective implementation of these safety arrangements has been 
internationally recognised. Within the framework of the 
programmes of the European Community (EC) for economic assistance 
to Central and Eastern European States (PHARE) and to the ex-USSR 
States (TACIS), priority has been assigned to assistance in 
nuclear safety. Support to nuclear safety authorities is a 
fundamental component of the assistance programme. 
The technical framework for the implementation of the EC 
assistance in the field of nuclear safety regulation under the 
PHARE and TACIS programmes is the CONCERT Group. This Group 
consists of the nuclear safety authorities represented in the CEC 
Working Group on "Safety of Thermal Reactors: Methodology, 
Criteria, Codes and Standards" (EC Member States, Sweden and 
Finland) and representatives of those nuclear safety authorities 
of Central and Eastern European States and ex-USSR States that 
accepted the CEC' s invitation to become Group members. In June 
1991 the CONCERT Group initiated a programme of information 
exchange, supported by practical assistance, relating to the 
objectives, requirements and arrangements for establishing a 
national nuclear safety regulatory regime. The programme centred 
around the required legislative and administrative framework, the 
regulatory provisions, the safety related responsibilities, safety 
standards and licensing arrangements. 
In recognition of the regulatory assistance needed (as identified 
by the CONCERT Group), Western European members established a 
Regulatory Assistance Management Group (RAMG) as an advisory group 
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to the CEC for the effective implementation of regulatory 
assistance programmes to regulatory authorities in Central and 
Eastern European States and t:he ex-USSR States, and to advise the 
Commission on any requests received for assistance from their 
regulatory organisations. The RAMG has proposed for its general 
method of work that any requests for assistance should be viewed 
against a deeper understanding of the requesting country's needs, 
and a knowledge of the country's legal bases, structures, state of 
development and methods of working. It has also established 
guide-lines for use in its exploratory missions for ascertaining 
such information. 
A Task Force was appointed by the RAMG to develop guidance on the 
establishment of an effective nuclear safety regulatory regime. 
Part 1 of this guidance, dealing with fundamental objectives and 
requirements, is the subject of this Report. In developing its 
guidance, the Task Force has drawn upon the practical experience 
accumulated over several decades in the assurance of nuclear 
safety in Europe; it has also taken into account the safety 
objectives and supporting basic safety principles identified by 
the Nuclear Safety Standards Advisory Group (NUSSAG) established 
by the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
The guidance provided in Part 1 is intended for those at the 
senior governmental and regulatory level in countries, including 
those in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, 
where arrangements for regulating nuclear safety are currently 
being introduced, revised or strengthened. It should also serve 
as a reference upon which RAMG members can draw when carrying out 
practical assistance missions. In addition, the Report should 
serve as a source of information for a wider, non-specialist 
audience, including those at the socio-political level and 
interested members of the general public, for furthering their 
understanding of how a nuclear regulatory regime should function. 
It is planned to publish additional guidance being developed 
currently by the Task Force. This will complement the guidance 
provided in Part 1 by addressing the more practical arrangements 
that need to be established in order to provide for effective 
nuclear safety regulation. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
BACKGROUND 
101. There is no such thing as absolute safety and no human 
activity, however beneficial, is entirely free from risk.1 
Normal socio-economic pressures dictate that the benefits received 
as a result of an industrial activity should outweigh the 
associated detriment, although the population group bearing the 
risk detriment resulting from a particular activity is not 
necessarily the same as that receiving the benefit. As with many 
industrial activities, installations within the nuclear fuel cycle 
may present a risk to plant workers, to those who live within the 
vicinity and, in exceptional circumstances, to society as a whole, 
if the process is not adequately controlled. Effective measures 
must, therefore, be implemented in accordance with established 
criteria to limit the potential for harm from all reasonably 
foreseeable circumstances that may arise during the routine 
operation of the plant or in the event of a plant accident. 
102. Many first generation nuclear power plants and their 
supporting installations within the nuclear fuel cycle were 
designed and built some 30 or more years ago, employing techniques 
and materials that, in some cases, were relatively novel. Even 
so, the potential harm that could result from an accident was 
recognised and conservative designs incorporating best practices, 
and involving large safety margins, were employed. Since then, 
there has been a steady development in safety concepts and 
technology, with major advances and improvements in materials, 
control and instrumentation, testing and inspection techniques, 
and in computational methods. The more recently designed and 
built nuclear power plants have been able to benefit from these 
safety developments. Many older plant have also benefited through 
1 For the purposes of this Report, 
probability of a specified harmful 
specified period of time. 
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'risk' 
effect 
is defined as the 
occurring within a 
judicious modifications and upgrading of their safety provisions. 
Recent years have seen an increasing awareness of what the public 
expects in terms of safety, and the evolvement and application of 
a more formalised nuclear safety culture. 
103. 'Nuclear safety' refers to the collective arrangements for 
the prevention of accidents and the limitation of their effects 
with respect to the design, construction, operation and 
decommissioning of nuclear installations. The objective of these 
arrangements is to ensure the protection of all persons, property 
and the environment against any hazards, disruption or damage as a 
result of the construction, operation and decommissioning of 
nuclear installations, including any plant malfunction or 
accident.2 
104. 'Radiological safety' (more commonly referred to as 
'radiological protection') is concerned with the protection of 
indi victuals, society as a whole, and the environment, from the 
harmful effects of exposure to ionising radiation, including 
exposures that may occur as the result of human activities. 
105. Although the terms 'nuclear safety' and 'radiological safety' 
are sometimes considered to refer to separate safety related 
disciplines, there is an inherent link between the two concepts. 
Without the additional health risks posed by the presence of 
ionising radiation, the safety problems associated with the 
nuclear fuel cycle would differ little from those encountered in 
many conventional industrial processes. Safety assessment 
decisions would then be based solely upon the conventional risk 
posed by the plant and there would be no need for the assessment 
to be more stringent than for any other (non-nuclear) plant having 
similar potential chemical engineering hazards (e.g., structural 
failures, explosions, release of toxic materials, etc.). 
2For the purposes of this report: 
'operation' includes the maintenance of the installation; 
'decommissioning' covers the activities within the period from 
final shut-down of the installation, through to its dismantling 
and release of the site for unrestricted use. 
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106. For the purposes of this Report, •nuclear safety• is deemed 
to embrace the composite safety provisions for preventing or 
providing an effective defence against any potential radiological 
consequences that might result from the normal operation of the 
plant or in the event of a plant malfunction or accident. 
107. Safe operation of a nuclear installation remains, at all 
times, the responsibility of the relevant operating organisation. 
It involves many factors, the more important of which include 
operating the plant within defined safety parameters, careful 
maintenance (including an effective programme of preventative 
maintenance), and implementing a scheduled programme of component 
inspections throughout the life of the plant. All of this should 
be supported by relevant research and development programmes, 
including those designed to monitor and predict any changes in 
material properties. Procedures for the safe operation of the 
plant should be fully documented and maintained. They should be 
supported by arrangements for recording and assessing the results 
of operational experience so that this can be drawn upon to effect 
further improvements in the overall safety of the plant and its 
operation. A comprehensive safety auditing and quality assurance 
programme should be implemented to ensure that these procedures 
and arrangements continue to be effective. 
108. To provide for an effective control on safety in the 
development and use of nuclear power, countries with nuclear power 
programmes normally establish regimes for regulating their nuclear 
installations. The regulatory arrangements established in support 
of such regimes, and particularly those relating to safety 
assessment, licensing and inspection, generally reflect the 
guidance developed in these areas at the international level, 
including that published by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
( IAEA) . It is the task of the nuclear regulator to ensure that 
nuclear safety is first assured through careful assessment of the 
initial design concept and intent, followed by stringent 
monitoring of the plant design, construction and commissioning, 
before licensed operation of the installation is permitted to 
commence. Through a concerted programme of assessment and 
inspection, this process of regulatory control continues 
throughout the life of an installation and until completion of 
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decommissioning. Thus, through the combined application of 
effective operator control and regulatory vigilance, safe 
operation should be established and maintained on both a year-by-
year as well as a day-by-day basis. 
PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
109. The purpose of this Report is to provide guidance on the 
requirements that need to be satisfied in establishing and 
maintaining an effective nuclear safety regulatory regime. These 
requirements are aimed at achieving identified safety objectives, 
and are based upon the application of established safety 
principles and practical supporting criteria. The guidance draws 
on procedures and arrangements that have been developed and 
implemented by nuclear regulators within Western European 
countries. It also includes internationally recognised 'good 
practices' in the field of nuclear safety. 
110. This document (Part 1 of the Report) sets out the nuclear 
safety objectives and supporting principles on which an effective 
nuclear safety regulatory regime should be based. It provides 
guidance on the supporting legislative requirements, the framework 
and operation of the regulatory organisation, and the provisions 
for licensing, safety assessment, inspection and regulatory 
enforcement. The organisational interface requirements essential 
for implementing the regulatory regime and ensuring that it 
functions effectively are reviewed, as are the provisions of the 
operating organisation for satisfying its regulatory obligations 
and maintaining an effective level of nuclear safety. Provisions 
for maintaining regulatory effectiveness are also reviewed. 
111. To complement the guidance set out in Part 1, the more 
practical requirements to be taken into account when establishing 
and implementing the regulatory arrangements will be the subject 
of further parts to this Report. However, the Report, as a whole, 
is not intended to be a source of guidance on detailed safety 
arrangements, for which the reader is referred to the relevant 
subject areas within the IAEA Safety Series, and in particular, 
the NUSS Codes and Guides. 
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PRESENTATION 
112. In presenting the Report, the Task Force recognises that the 
specific legislative and administrative provisions and supporting 
arrangements for establishing an effective nuclear regulatory 
regime can differ significantly between countries. In some 
countries, for example, responsibility for the different elements 
that make up the regulatory process, such as 1 icensing, safety 
assessment, inspection and enforcement, has been vested within a 
single organisation. In others, the responsibility has been 
apportioned between several organisations. The particular 
arrangements adopted will tend to be dictated by established 
national practice. Those of one country should not be judged as 
being either more, or less, safety effective or advantageous just 
because they differ from those of another. The essential 
criterion is whether the arrangements adopted provide the basis 
for an effective regulatory regime to be achieved in practice. 
113. For the purposes of this. Report, the responsibilities for 
pre-licensing and operational safety assessment, licensing 
procedures, inspection, and the enforcement of regulatory 
arrangements, are considered to be carried out within a single 
organisation, referred to as the 'regulatory organisation'. This 
should allow the reader to concentrate upon the underlying 
principles for establishing and maintaining an effective nuclear 
safety regulatory regime, and how these might best be implemented 
within the constraints of his own particular national practices. 
114. The operating organisation is the body responsible for the 
operation of a nuclear installation (see footnote 2). For the 
purposes of this Report, the operating organisation includes those 
organisations that carry out the functions of design, engineering 
and construction of the installation. When a licence is issued to 
the operating organisation authorising it to construct or operate 
a nuclear installation, the operating organisation also becomes 
the licensee. Thus, where the Report refers to licensed nuclear 
installations, the terms 'operating organisation' and 'licensee' 
are considered to be synonymous unless otherwise stated. 
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TERMINOLOGY 
The terminology used in this Report is similar to that used in the 
IAEA Nuclear Safety Series. In particular, the reader is referred 
to the definitions provided 1n the Safety Standards - Codes on the 
Safety of Nuclear power plants - IAEA Safety Series No.SO (Rev.l). 
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2. NUCLEAR SAFETY OBJECTIVES 
201. Nuclear installations should be sited, designed, constructed, 
commissioned, operated and decommissioned in accordance with 
strict requirements and regulations that have been developed to 
protect plant personnel, the public and the environment from harm. 
Any hazards arising from these activities should be strictly 
controlled. An effective nuclear safety regulatory regime should 
ensure that this objective is achieved. 
FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES 
202. The safety objectives and supporting principles that, 
jointly, provide the foundations for such a regulatory regime, and 
upon which this Report is based, have been discussed at the 
national, international and intergovernmental level over a number 
of years (Refs. 1, 2) . The internationally agreed Basic Safety 
Objectives and their supporting Fundamental Safety Principles are 
summarised in the !AEA NUSSAG report "The Safety of Nuclear 
Installations Safety Fundamentals" (Ref.3). These objectives 
and principles are concerned with 1 imi ting the risk to workers, 
and society as a whole, from the effects of exposure to ionising 
radiations, either as a direct consequence of workplace activities 
within the nuclear fuel cycle, or indirectly through the impact of 
such activities upon the environment. The three Basic Safety 
Objectives that an effective nuclear safety regulatory regime must 
meet are presented in this Section. The Fundamental Safety 
Principles that support these objectives, and that should provide 
the foundation for an effective nuclear safety regulatory regime, 
are summarised in Appendix 1.3 
203. A number of the Fundamental Safety Principles have direct 
relevance to the regulatory organisation. They provide the basis 
3To avoid confusion when defining the safety objectives and 
principles, the identical NUSSAG wording has been used. 
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for the generic guidance set out in this Report, which amplifies 
them and indicates how they can be applied in practice. Although 
national practices will determine how any particular country 
implements the guidance, no nuclear safety regulatory regime can 
be considered fully effective unless it can be demonstrated that 
all of the relevant Fundamental Safety Principles have been 
satisfied. The national regulatory arrangements should, 
therefore, be examined to ensure that, as a minimum, the 
requirements of the Basic Safety Objectives and of the relevant 
Fundamental Safety Principles will be met. 
204. Those Fundamental Safety Principles considered to be of 
particular relevance to the guidance presented in each of the 
following Sections of this Report are identified at the beginning 
of the particular Section. 
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NUCLEAR SAFETY 
205. The General Nuclear Safety Objective: 
To protect individuals, society and the environment from harm 
by establishing and maintaining in nuclear installations 
effective defences against radiological hazards. 
206. Individuals, society and the environment need to be protected 
from the harmful effects of exposure to ionising radiation 
resulting from the use of nuclear energy. The potential for 
exposure to ionising radiation, either directly due to its 
penetration through the containment, from direct contact with 
radioactive materials, or from the intake of radioactive materials 
into the body by ingestion or inhalation, is inherent in the 
majority of nuclear fuel cycle processes. 
207. Compliance with the General Nuclear Safety Objective requires 
that nuclear 
commissioned, 
manner as to 
installations are designed, constructed, 
operated and eventually decommissioned in such a 
keep all potential sources of radiation exposure 
under strict technical and administrative control. 
208. The General Nuclear Safety Objective is supported by two 
complementary safety objectives, one relating to radiological 
safety and the other to technical safety aspects. They are inter-
dependent, in that the technical safety aspects, in conjunction 
with the administrative and procedural measures for their 
effective implementation, ensure the appropriate defence against 
hazards from ionising radiation. 
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RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY 
209. The Radiological Safety Objective: 
To ensure that in all operational states radiation exposure 
within the installation or due to any planned release of 
radioactive material from the installation is kept below 
prescribed limits and as low as reasonably achievable, and to 
ensure mitigation of the radiological consequences due to 
accidents. 
210. The concepts for providing protection against the harmful 
effects of ionising radiation are now well established. At both 
the national and international level, legislation and guidance 
relating to radiological safety generally reflect the 
recommendations of the International Commission for Radiological 
Protection ( ICRP) (Refs. 4, 5) . 4 Its most recent recommendations 
on basic radiation protection principles are set out in ICRP 
Publication No.60 (Ref.6) and cover both normal and abnormal 
situations. The recommendations 
organisations having national 
protection (e.g., Ref.7). 
have been summarised by several 
responsibility for radiological 
211. Where the source of radiation exposure is under control, ICRP 
recommends that the practice giving rise to the exposure must be 
justified, the protection must be optimised to ensure that 
exposures are as low as reasonably achievable (the ALARA concept), 
and the exposure of individuals should not exceed prescribed dose 
limits. When establishing radiological protection arrangements 
for workers at nuclear installations or the public, including dose 
limits, the relevant national authority should ensure that these 
arrangements will enable the ICRP recommendations to be satisfied. 
4For example: Basic Safet:y Standards for Radiation Protection 
(1982 Edition); IAEA Safety Series No. 9, IAEA, Vienna (1982). 
Euratom Basic Safety Standards; Directives of the Commission of 
the European Communities, 1980-84. (These publications are 
currently under review to implement the ICRP 60 recommendations.) 
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212. At those installations where radioactive liquid and gaseous 
wastes resulting from the particular fuel cycle process may need 
to be discharged to the air or into local waterways, all such 
discharges should be justified and the requirements should be 
subject to formal assessment and authorisation by the relevant 
authorities and strictly controlled. The authorisation should 
ensure that radiological protection criteria will be met, taking 
into account the quantity and radionuclide content of the 
discharges, their movement and dilution along the environmental 
pathways, potential reconcentration and re-entry into the 
foodchain, and any abnormal dietary habits of the potentially 
exposed population. Any inter-governmental or international 
requirements relating to the discharge of radioactive wastes 
should also be taken into account. 
213. An effective defence should also be maintained against the 
accidental release of radioactive materials. Where the source of 
radiation exposure is not under control - albeit temporarily - as 
in the event of a nuclear accident, ICRP recognises that it may 
only be possible to limit exposure by some form of intervention 
action, the nature, extent and timing of which will depend on the 
prevailing circumstances and, particularly, upon the potential 
hazard the situation poses to plant workers, the public and the 
environment. Formal emergency response plans should, therefore, 
be developed before a nuclear installation is commissioned or 
commences operation. These should encompass both the on-site and 
off-site arrangements for ensuring that remedial actions 
appropriate to the nature of the accident situation can be 
implemented within the requisite time to prevent or mitigate any 
possible adverse effects. 
- 11 -
TECHNICAL SAFETY 
214. The Technical Safety Objective: 
To take all reasonably practicable 
accidents in nuclear installations 
measures to prevent 
and to mitigate their 
consequences should they occur; to ensure with a high level 
of confidence that, for all possible accidents taken into 
account in the design of the installation including those of 
very low probability, the radiological consequences, if any, 
would be minor and below prescribed 1 imi ts; and to ensure 
that the likelihood of accidents with serious radiological 
consequences is extremely small. 
215. In order to satisfy the Technical Safety Objective, not only 
must the conventional as well as the radiological hazards 
pertaining to the normal operation of a plant be taken into 
account when assessing the safety of installations operating 
within the nuclear fuel cycle, but also the potential consequences 
of their combined effect as the result of any plant malfunction or 
accident. 
216. Thus, to meet the nuclear safety objectives as a whole, it is 
necessary both to limit the radiation exposure incurred as the 
result of normal operation, and to prevent, with a high degree of 
confidence, the likelihood of any plant malfunction or accident 
that could lead to a loss of control over the source of exposure. 
The design of the installation should incorporate conservative 
safety margins, backed by protection systems that limit, control 
or shut down operations if the operational safety boundaries are 
breached. Together with strict adherence to plant operating 
procedures, these arrangements should ensure that the probability 
of an uncontrolled release of radioactive material from the 
installation will be very low. 
217. Despite these arrangements, the possibility of a plant 
failure or accident that might result in the release of 
radioactive material into the environment and the consequential 
exposure of plant personnel and the public, can never be entirely 
eliminated. The design safety assessment of the installation 
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should demonstrate that the potential radiological consequences of 
any accident, including those of low probability, is likely to be 
small. Never-the-less, emergency response arrangements should be 
established to mitigate the possible extent of any radiation 
exposures should an accident occur. It is essential for measures 
that may need to be implemented, both on and off the site, to 
mitigate such consequences be planned in advance, and in place and 
tested before the plant is allowed to operate. 
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3. LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK 
Relevant Fundamental Safety Principles: 1, 2, 3. 
301. An effective level of nuclear safety cannot be achieved 
unless all organisations involved demonstrate a clear commitment 
to this objective, and it is supported at the national level by 
adequate legal provisions, implemented through an effective 
nuclear safety regulatory regime. Those countries that have 
implemented or intend to implement a nuclear power programme 
should ensure that effective legislative and administrative 
provisions are in place to provide for the safe regulation of the 
industry and for the clear assignment of safety related 
responsibilities. Responsibility for ensuring that the 
appropriate legislative framework is established, including any 
necessary supporting legislation and statutory provisions for 
implementing the regulatory process, will normally rest with 
national Government and Parliament. Guidance on the criteria that 
should govern the legislative and administrative provisions is 
provided in this Section. 
NATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
302. Although constitutional differences between countries may 
result in different approaches to the establishment of national 
regulatory arrangements, there are a number of basic criteria for 
ensuring effective regulatory control that should be common to all 
national provisions, as set out below. 
303. Identification of Responsibility: The governmental 
department or organisation responsible at the national level for 
ensuring that the legislative and administrative provisions 
relating to the safe use of nuclear energy are properly 
implemented, including the establishment of an effective 
regulatory organisation, should be clearly identified. 
304. Separation of Responsibilities: The nuclear regulatory 
responsibilities should be confined within a single, identifiable, 
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organisation, the regulatory organisation. This organisation 
should be effectively independent of any organisation having 
responsibility for the promotion or utilisation of nuclear energy, 
and should have separate reporting lines of responsibility to 
Government andjor Parliament. 
305. There should also be a clear separation of responsibilities 
between the regulatory organisation and the operating 
organisation. 
306. Responsibility for Safety: The legislative arrangements 
should assign the prime responsibility for the safety of a nuclear 
installation to the relevant operating organisation 
307. Regulatory Responsibility: The objective of the regulatory 
organisation is the safety of nuclear installations. It should be 
assigned responsibility for the assessment, licensing and 
inspection of all nuclear installations within the nuclear fuel 
cycle and for enforcing the relevant regulatory arrangements. 
Hence, the 
responsible 
regulatory and operating organisations are each 
for different facets of nuclear safety within the 
overall national legislative framework. 
308. Regulatory Terms of Reference: The scope of the authority 
and powers delegated to the regulatory organisation to enable it 
to fulfil its responsibilities should be prescribed within the 
legislative and administrative provisions and should form the 
basis of the organisation's terms of reference. These should 
clearly indicate to whom the regulatory organisation reports at 
the governmental I parliamentary level on matters of nuclear 
safety, and provide for direct and rapid access whenever the 
regulatory organisation considers this to be necessary in the 
interests of safety. The regulatory organisation should be 
precluded from undertaking any duties or responsibilities that 
might conflict with, or jeopardise, its responsibilities in 
relation to the safety of nuclear installations. 
309. Provision for Resources: The legislative j administrative 
arrangements should include provisions for ensuring that the 
regulatory organisation has adequate resources, including 
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facilities, suitably qualified staff and appropriate funding 
arrangements, to enable it at all times to fulfil its statutory 
responsibilities in an effective manner. 
310. Regulatory Enforcement Penalties: The prime objective of 
nuclear regulation is the enhancement of safety, rather than the 
punishment of regulatory violations. Where penalties are required 
for non-compliance with regulatory requirements, they should be 
real, effective and enforceable at law. Such penalties should be 
directed at the operating organisation, rather than individuals. 
However, the legislation should not preclude individuals who are 
guilty of severe misdemeanours, such as deliberate safety 
violations (as compared with human error faults), from 
prosecution. 
311. Socio-Economic Factors: Should social, economic or other 
factors need to be balanced against any nuclear or radiological 
safety related decision (ie, where national considerations 
determine that these factors may need to override the safety 
requirements of the regulatory organisation), the final decision 
should only be made at the more senior political 1 governmental 
level. 
312. Other Safety Related Legislation: When establishing the 
legislative and administrative framework for the safe regulation 
of nuclear energy, the relevance of any existing national safety 
related legislation should also be taken into consideration to 
ensure that there is no clash of interests in its application. 
CONSULTATION 
313. Consultation on Proposed New Installations: Any decision to 
site and operate a nuclear installation should be preceded by a 
structured consideration of its potential societal impact, and of 
the specific nuclear safety issues relating to both normal 
operation and the provision of emergency response arrangements. 
To ensure that these aspects are fully considered, the legislative 
and administrative arrangements adopted by some countries require 
the licence applicant to consult the relevant governmental 
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organisations and bodies having responsibilities for health, 
safety and environmental issues. These organisations and bodies 
should, in turn, consult with and advise the regulatory 
organisation on any relevant safety related concern they may have 
with regard to the proposed installation, so that this may be 
taken into consideration when the regulatory organisation formally 
advises on whether the proposed installation should be licensed. 
This requirement to provide safety related advice to the 
regulatory organisation should extend throughout the life of the 
installation and its decommissioning. 
314. Consultation and Statement on Environmental Impact: Both 
national requirements and international commitments may require 
the licence applicant or the relevant governmental organisation to 
consult, and to provide an assessment and formal statement, on the 
potential environmental impact from the operation and 
decommissioning of the proposed installation, including the 
generation, management and disposal of any radioactive waste. 
Although the consultative provisions discussed above should enable 
some of these issues to be resolved, those responsible at the 
governmental level for deciding whether to grant permission for 
the siting of the installation are likely to have to take into 
account a broader range of public, political, economic, technical 
and other specialist opinions, before making a formal decision. 
315. Public Inquiries: In the majority of industrial countries 
there is a significant level of public concern with regard to the 
safety of nuclear installations. Any new construction proposal is 
likely to generate considerable critical response, particularly if 
the proposed site is in proximity to an area of high population 
density, or if the area is considered to be of significant amenity 
or environmental importance. In some countries, the initial 
consultative process enables the proposals to be considered more 
openly through the forum of a public inquiry. Depending upon the 
particular national practice, this arrangement may be an integral 
part of the normal consultative process, or only implemented in 
response to a formal request by concerned parties. 
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316. Summaries of the legislative and administrative arrangements 
relating to the regulation of nuclear energy in OECD Member 
countries are given in Refs.8, 9 and 10. A detailed study of the 
legislation adopted by one country (Sweden) is given in Ref.11. 
-19-

4. THE REGULATORY ORGANISATION 
Relevant Fundamental Safety Principles: 1, 3, 4, 6, 8. 
401.The regulatory organisation is the body responsible within the 
national legislative and administrative framework for the 
licensing and inspection of nuclear installations, and for the 
enforcement of the regulatory requirements. Its primary duty is 
the implementation of an effective regulatory regime for the safe 
siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation, 
maintenance and decommissioning of nuclear installations within 
the national boundaries. The regulatory organisation should be 
established in accordance with the criteria set out in Section 3, 
and particularly paras. 303-310. It should be structured and 
organised so as to provide the essential elements for ensuring 
effective regulatory control. The criteria upon which an 
effective regulatory regime should be based are summarised in 
paras. 402-409 below. Guidance on the general arrangements for 
their implementation is given in the remainder of this Section. 
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REQUIREMENTS 
402. Establishment of the Regulatory Organisation: To the extent 
possible, the regulatory organisation should be established in 
advance of the construction of the first nuclear installation. 
The size of the regulatory organisation and the level of resources 
allocated to it should, at all times, take into account the size, 
structure, organisation and potential development of the national 
nuclear programme. 
403. Regulatory Responsibility: Within the legislative and 
administrative framework established by national government for 
the regulation of nuclear safety, the regulatory organisation 
should have responsibilities for the licensing process. In 
support of this function it should implement effective 
arrangements for the assessment of safety analysis submissions and 
for the inspection of nuclear installations in pursuance of 
regulatory compliance and enforcement. No other responsibilities 
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should be permitted to jeopardise or conflict with the regulatory 
organisation's responsibility for the regulation of nuclear 
safety. 
404. Regulatory Independence: It is a paramount prerequisite that 
the regulatory organisation is effectively independent of those 
organisations or bodies concerned with the promotion of nuclear 
activities. The control of the activities of the regulatory 
organisation by government and parliament should be clearly 
defined, together with the inter-relationships with other relevant 
governmental and national organisations. Although the regulatory 
organisation may be part of the governmental structure, it should 
be functionally independent so that its decisions may be taken 
without undue pressure. This arrangement provides for the 
essential public credibility of the regulator. Furthermore, the 
regulatory organisation should not be required to assume other 
responsibilities in addition to matters of nuclear safety 
interest, as this may significantly diminish its authority and 
effectiveness. 
405. Authority for Nuclear Safety: The statutory authority vested 
in the regulatory organisation should be clearly defined, as 
should the extent to which such authority is devolved to its 
professional regulatory staff. The regulatory organisation has 
considerable discretionary authority delegated to it in matters of 
nuclear safety and is responsible for ensuring that its functions 
are carried out in an effective and credible manner. 
406. No other regulatory organisation should be able to override 
the authority of the nuclear regulatory organisation in relation 
to nuclear safety. 
407. Professional Competence: The regulatory organisation should 
be responsible for maintaining a high level of professional 
competence, commensurate with its safety assurance role. It 
should ensure that it has sufficient numbers of adequately 
qualified, trained and experienced regulatory staff, preferably 
with a background in the nuclear or other relevant industry. They 
should have a clear understanding of the organisation's regulatory 
role and objectives, and how these are expected to be met in 
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practice. They should also have a clear understanding of the 
legal criteria and authority upon which their activities are 
based, the discretionary powers delegated to them, and how these 
should govern their assessment, licensing, inspection, and 
enforcement activities. To broaden its approach in its regulation 
of nuclear safety, the regulatory organisation should establish 
arrangements for effective liaison with other relevant national 
institutions and regulatory authorities, nuclear regulatory 
authorities in other countries, and with relevant international 
and inter-governmental organisations. 
408. Public Accountability: It is essential for the regulatory 
organisation to establish and maintain public confidence in the 
effectiveness of the nuclear safety regulatory regime and in its 
supporting provisions for ensuring the protection of individuals, 
society and the environment. To this end, the regulatory 
organisation should adopt a policy of public accountability, 
setting out its regulatory objectives, policies, and standards 
(including the criteria against which it assesses the safety of 
licence applications), and the effectiveness with which they are 
implemented. This should be done in such a way that the 
responsibilities of the regulatory organisation, and the manner in 
which they are met, can be readily understood by a non-specialist 
audience. The regulatory organisation should also ensure that its 
regulatory decisions, and the background against which they are 
taken, are properly documented. The reasoning in support of major 
policy decisions, including those relating to the granting of 
nuclear site licences, should be explained and made available to 
all organisations or persons who may have an interest, including 
members of the public. 
REGULATORY FUNCTIONS 
409. Although the size, structure and responsibilities of the 
regulatory organisation may differ between countries, depending 
upon the particular legislative and administrative provisions 
adopted, there are a number of regulatory functions that should be 
common to any effective nuclear regulatory regime. A number of 
these functions are concerned with carrying out the regulatory 
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organisation's statutory responsibilities; additional functions 
provide for the establishment of the necessary support 
arrangements. The following paragraphs cover the need for policy 
guidance, definitions of safety requirements, and the 
establishment of emergency response arrangements. Guidance on the 
implementation of the licensing, assessment, inspection, 
compliance and enforcement functions is provided separately in 
Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8, respectively. 
410. Policy and Guidance: Within the overall framework of 
licensing it will be necessary to develop regulatory policy, 
together with guidance on its implementation, for a number of 
specific subject areas, including: 
- statutory requirements governing the granting of nuclear 
site licences, including the specification of licence 
conditions with which operators must comply; 
- siting policies for proposed new installations; 
- criteria for application in the safety assessment and 
licensing process; 
- radioactive waste management strategy; 
- liaison with other national and international 
organisations; 
The diversity of the tasks within this area will demand a range of 
professional skills and experience covering technical, legal and 
administrative disciplines. 
411. Defining Safety Requirements: The regulatory organisation 
should be responsible for defining the safety requirements with 
which the operating organisation must comply. It should establish 
assessment procedures and monitoring arrangements, including on-
site inspections, to verify that the operating organisation is 
meeting its regulatory commitments and that its policies are aimed 
at maintaining high levels of safety. These safety levels should 
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be subject to appropriate checllcs, controls and on-going 
reassessment by the regulatory organisation. 
412. Developing Rules, Codes and Guidance: To enable the 
operating organisation to identify it:s regulatory commitments, and 
to provide a basis upon which to assess the operator's regulatory 
and safety related response, the n~gulatory organisation should 
establish appropriate safety objectives and assessment criteria. 
To ensure that these objectives and criteria can be properly 
interpreted and effectively implemented, they should be supported 
through the development of rules, codes of practice, procedures 
and guidance. As an input to this development, the regulatory 
organisation should take into account appropriate national 
standards, as well as relevant international standards (e.g., 
Refs.12, 13), together with recognised good nuclear safety 
practices, particularly those relating to similar types of plant 
and equipment. In approving the application of such rules, codes 
of practice or guidance, the regulatory organisation should 
exercise care that their adoption is not construed as relieving 
the operating organisation of its safety responsibilities. 
413. Establishing Emergency Response! Arrangements: The regulatory 
organisation should require the operating organisation/licensee to 
make suitable arrangements for responding to abnormal and accjdent 
situations (Ref .14). These should include the provision of site 
accident management procedures and supporting arrangements for 
regaining control of the plant and returning it to a safe 
condition, and for implementing remedial actions aimed at 
terminating any release of radioactive material and mitigating its 
on-site and off-site consequences. Arrangements for the 
introduction of off-site measures for the protection of the public 
should normally rest with the public authorities, at both the 
local and national level (Ref.15). 
414. Developing Emergency Response! Plans: Emergency response 
plans for mitigating the radiological risk to the public should be 
developed in advance by the relevant authorities, including the 
regulatory organisation, and should be coordinated with those of 
the operating organisation to ensure an effective integrated 
response. All organisations and persons who may be required to 
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respond in accordance with the plan in the event of an accident 
should be made aware of their responsibilities and of the actions 
they should take. Those members of the public who may be affected 
by the response should also be aware of the arrangements that have 
been made for their protection. The plans should in place before 
the installation is commissioned and should be regularly tested by 
appropriate exercises throughout its lifetime (Ref.16, 17). 
ORGANISATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
415. The structure of the regulatory organisation should provide 
for clear lines of control, responsibility and reporting, with 
effective coordination and well defined interface arrangements, 
both internally and with the operating organisation. 
416. Size of the Regulatory Organisation: The actual size and 
structure of the regulatory organisation, and the regulatory 
approach adopted, will tend to be dictated by, inter alia, the 
particular constitutional and legal framework of the country, the 
specific responsibilities assigned to the organisation, the size 
of the nuclear power programme, the number of utilities, and the 
extent to which sub-contracting arrangements are used. 
417. In the early stages of a nuclear power programme the limited 
number of installations and of suitably qualified staff may place 
constraints on the size of the regulatory organisation. However, 
as the number of installations increases, the size and sub-
divisions within the functional areas should be reviewed and 
expanded accordingly. 
418. Structure of the Regulatory Organisation: The structure of 
the regulatory organisation in a country with a highly centralised 
governmental system may differ significantly from one in a federal 
system. In a federal system, each constituent state or county may 
wish to develop and implement its own state law, in addition to 
the federal law and legislative arrangements. The regulation of 
nuclear safety and of nuclear installations under a federal system 
may require the extensive direct involvement of regulators, 
inspectors or assessors located in several agencies or 
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governmental organisations, including those in the particular 
state or county within which the specific nuclear installation is 
to be located. Similarly, a regulatory organisation that is 
incorporated as part of a larger governmental organisation, and 
upon whose facilities and services i·t is expected to draw support 
for some of its less specialised functions (such as the provision 
of legal advice, administrative support, etc.), or for its budget, 
will differ from that of a more autonomous organisation. 
419. The regulatory organisational arrangements applying in a 
number of OECD Member countries are reviewed in Refs. 18 - 22. 
420. Provision of Resources: The leqislative arrangements should 
provide for sufficient resources to be made available to establish 
and maintain an efficient, competent and independent regulatory 
organisation. It is important that the level of resources made 
available enable the regulatory organisation to carry out its 
duties, particularly with regard ·to site inspection, without 
having to rely upon the services or draw upon the resources of the 
operating organisation. 
421. Adequate provisions for financing the regulatory organisation 
should be made, for example, through fees levied on the operators 
of nuclear installations. To carry out its work, the regulatory 
organisation should have available: 
- sufficient and suitably qualified staff; 
- adequately equipped off ice accommodation in suitably 
located buildings (HeadquartE:!rs, Regional or Site-based) 
that will allow regulatory staff to carry out their duties 
effectively; 
- effective communication arransrements (telephone, facsimile, 
telex, radio-telephone, computer links, transport, etc.); 
- adequate technical and administrative support (including 
secretarial services, computer access, personal computers, 
calculators, word-processing facilities, document 
reproduction and storage, photographic, video and audio 
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recording, access 
facilities, etc.). 
to technical information, library 
422. staffing Arrangements: The regulatory organisation should 
ensure that all functions required of its staff can be adequately 
performed and directed, and that it is able to act independently 
of all bodies or organisations over which it has, or may have, 
regulatory responsibility. It should also ensure that the expert 
resources available to the organisation are focused on the 
statutory tasks to be accomplished and that the duties of all 
staff are clearly defined and documented. 
423. Establishing staffing Policy: The regulatory organisation 
should establish a staffing policy based on a graded structure of 
professional and technical expertise and commensurate at all times 
with the size of the regulatory programme. The policy should 
indicate the required numbers of professional, technical and 
support staff, and the functions to which they will be assigned 
(e.g., assessment, inspection, preparation of regulations and 
guides, legal matters, administrative support, etc.). The need to 
provide for Headquarters, regional and resident site inspection 
should also be taken into account. The staff structure should 
provide avenues 
responsibilities 
for promotion between 
of each grade should be 
the grades; 
clearly defined, 
the 
as 
should the job description, terms of reference, 
qualifications and experience for each individual post. 
required 
424. The professional competence of regulatory staff should also 
be kept under review. They should participate, as appropriate, in 
on-going programmes of training aimed at maintaining an adequate 
level of regulatory expertise, and in keeping abreast of national 
and international developments in the field of nuclear safety. 
425. Staff Remuneration: To provide for mutual respect and a 
professional dialogue between regulators and licensees, regulatory 
staff should not only be suitably experienced, qualified and 
trained, but their level of reward, including financial 
remuneration, should not compare unfavourably with that received 
by staff at a similar level of responsibility in the operating 
organisation. Without such provisions, the regulatory 
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organisation is unlikely to be able to attract the high calibre 
staff essential for effectively implementing its regulatory 
responsibilities or to retain those ~~ith experience, a factor that 
will be of increasing importance as the organisation increases in 
size. 
426. Provision of Expert Safety Advice: Although the regulatory 
organisation should have the sole re~sponsibility for recommending 
whether an installation may be licensed, and for implementing the 
regulatory arrangements, this should not preclude it from seeking 
external expert advice on nuclear safety issues. The governmental 
organisation to which the regulatory organisation reports, 
together with other relevant national organisations, may also 
require access to such advice. Where specific analyses or 
assessments require specialist skills that are not available 
within the regulatory organisation, provision should be made for 
drawing upon specialist advice, eit:her through the services of 
suitably qualified external consultants or by establishing 
appropriate advisory committees. 
427. Advisory Committees: The composition of any particular 
advisory committee will be dictated by its purpose and the level 
of advice (in terms of its relative importance to major safety 
issues) that the committee is expeci:ed to provide. The essential 
criteria are that members, which may include foreign experts, 
should be chosen for the particular expertise that they will be 
able to contribute; that all disciplines essential for the 
provision of sound, equitable and discerning advice are 
represented; and that there is a minimum number of members who are 
independent of the regulatory and the operating organisations. 
Advisory committees should not have regulatory or enforcement 
powers; rather, their role should be confined to the provision of 
expert and unbiased policy advice. 
428. Technical Advisory Committees: Technical advisory committees 
may need to be established to provide in-depth advice on a range 
of technical and fundamental safety issues, such as the plant 
operating procedures being proposed by the operating organisation, 
pressure vessel integrity, radioactive waste management, 
computerised plant control, etc. Depending upon the type of 
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advice being sought and the time span over which it is required, 
such committees may need to be appointed on either a permanent or 
ad hoc advisory basis. 
429. Senior Advisory Committee: Where a committee is established 
to provide high level advice both to the regulatory organisation 
and to government on the broader issues relating to national 
nuclear safety policy (such as changes to nuclear law, national 
energy arrangements, etc.), the members should be appointed by the 
governmental body or minister to whom the committee will report. 
Committee members should be able to make their views known, 
independent of their organisation. Although it is not normal 
practice for the regulatory organisation to be a member of such a 
committee, arrangements should be made for it to maintain a close 
liaison with the committee, for example, by having a senior 
regulatory staff member attend meetings on an observer basis. 
Senior advisory committees are normally established on a long-
term, rather than ad hoc basis; however, membership will change 
with time and will need to reflect current nuclear safety 
philosophy. 
430. Examples of the provision of expert safety advice are given 
in Refs. 19, 20, 21 and 22. 
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5. LICENSING 
Relevant Fundamental Safety PrinciplE~s: 16, 25. 
501. It is normal practice for the control over nuclear 
installations and, therefore, ov,er nuclear safety, to be 
implemented through the application of a licensing system. The 
licence is usually granted only to a legally constituted operating 
organisation (the Licensee) and represents the formal 
authorisation for the construction or operation of the 
installation to proceed. National practice will dictate whether 
licences relating to nuclear installations are issued by the 
regulatory organisation or by somE~ other responsible national 
body. In the latter case, a licence should only be issued on the 
safety advice of the regulatory organisation. In either case, the 
practice in most countries is for the regulatory organisation to 
be responsible for ensuring that the licensing process and the 
operation of any licensed nuclear :Lnstallation is in compliance 
with any relevant statutory requirements. Its assessment and 
inspection functions support this process. 
NUCLEAR LICENCE 
502. Purpose: Although each country may have its own particular 
definition 
described 
of the term 'nuclear 1 icence' , 
as the authorisation issued 
it can be generally 
by the regulatory 
organisation to the operating organisation (the licensee) to carry 
out specific activities in relation a nuclear installation. The 
licence may have conditions attache:d to it in the interests of 
safety (see para. 508) . 5 The essential purpose of the nuclear 
licence, and of any conditions that it may impose in the interest 
of safety, is, inter alia, to: 
5For the purposes of this Report, the term 'licence' refers to 
the licence and its attached conditions. 
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- authorise 
carry out 
associated 
the operating 
a specified 
with the 
organisation (the 
activity or set 
siting, design, 
licensee) to 
of activities 
construction, 
commissioning, operation or decommissioning of a nuclear 
installation; 
- stipulate any requirements and conditions of the regulatory 
organisation that govern the performance of these 
activities; and 
- place any appropriate time restrictions on the validity of 
the authorisation. 
503. Content: The organisation responsible for licensing should 
ensure that any nuclear licence that it issues: 
- complies with the relevant national legislation; 
- accurately specifies the activities to be licensed and the 
place where they are to be carried out; 
- clearly indicates any constraints regarding the activities 
to be licensed (e.g., specific requirements, conditions or 
time limitations. 
504. A licence comprises a formal authorisation for the activities 
of the particular installation for which it is issued, a 
description I identification of the site at which it will be 
located, and a concise statement of the type and purpose of the 
installation. Additional documents may be attached to the licence 
as required. 
LICENSING PROCESS 
505. Licensing Stages: The licensing process covers the different 
stages in the regulatory control of a nuclear installation. The 
guidance provided in this Report is based on the assumption that a 
single licence (including any attached conditions) will be issued 
for the installation, prior to the commencement of construction. 
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However, it is also possible to issuE~ separate licences at various 
stages of the process. Irrespective of whether responsibility for 
the licensing of nuclear installations rests with the regulatory 
organisation or with a separate licensing body, the licensing 
process, from the initial design concept through to the final 
decommissioning and deregulation of the installation, can be 
broadly divided into the following s1:ages: 
- assessing the safety analyses and safety report submitted 
by the operating organisation in support of its application 
for the initial licensing of a particular installation, and 
determining whether or not the application should be 
approved; 
- preparing the licence and identifying any specific 
conditions with which the licensee will need to comply in 
the interests of safety; 
- issuing the licence to enable construction of the 
installation to proceed, together with any conditions 
with which the licensee must comply; 
- assessing any additional or up-dated safety reports that 
the operating organisation may be required to submit at 
successive stages 
initial operation 
whether permission 
stage; 
in the construction, commissioning and 
of the installation, and determining 
should be given to proceed to the next 
- updating the licence and its associated conditions, as 
appropriate, to reflect the regulatory requirements; 
- suspending activities under the licence should the 
regulatory organisation consider this to be necessary in 
the interests of safety; 
- updating the licence or the imposed conditions to take 
account of any modifications to the installation or of any 
additional safety information that becomes available; 
-33-
- modifying the licence and the imposed conditions on 
completion of operation of the installation to ensure that 
the plant is maintained in a safe state, or to enable 
decommissioning to take place; and 
- revoking the licence on completion of satisfactory 
decommissioning of the installation. 
506. To complete the licensing process it is also necessary to: 
- monitor the licensee to ensure compliance with the 
licence and with the imposed conditions; 
- implement any necessary enforcement actions against non-
compliance with the licence or the imposed conditions; 
507. operator's Arrangements: There should also be sufficient 
flexibility within the overall licensing framework to enable the 
operating organisation to propose the arrangements best suited to 
its particular operations, provided that they will meet any 
requirements imposed under the licence and any other safety 
requirements of the regulatory body. 
LICENCE CONDITIONS 
508. Objectives: In support of the licensing and regulatory 
process, the regulatory arrangements should provide for conditions 
and constraints to be imposed on the licensee in the interests of 
safety at any stage in the siting, design, construction, 
commissioning, operation, maintenance and eventual decommissioning 
of the particular installation for which a licence has been 
granted. Their objective should be to ensure that all reasonably 
practicable steps are taken by the licensee to protect workers on 
the site, members of the public and the environment from any risk 
arising from the operation of the installation. National 
arrangements will 
constraints should 
determine whether 
be incorporated as 
these conditions and 
an integral part of the 
licence, attached as an addendum to it, or issued as a separate 
regulatory requirement in support of the licensing or regulatory 
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function. However, 
report, they are 
for convenience, and for the purposes of this 
considered as being attached to the formal 
nuclear licence and will be referred to, generically, as 'licence 
conditions'. 
509. The licence conditions will govern the manner in which the 
installation may be operated and should be so worded as to allow 
the detailed level of compliance required by the licensing body or 
the regulatory organisation to reflect, and be appropriate to, the 
current stage of construction, commissioning, operation or 
decommissioning of the installation, as appropriate. 
510. Key Safety Related Conditions: Although the manner in which 
the licence conditions are prescribed, and their extent and 
detail, is a matter for individual regulatory organisations, the 
conditions should address the key areas relating to the safety of 
the plant, including: 
plant construction, commissioning and operation; 
- plant operating limits; 
- operating rules and procedures; 
- testing and maintenance procedures; 
- modification procedures; 
- operation and control of the plant by competent persons; 
- radiological protection; 
- radioactive waste management; 
- quality assurance; 
- nuclear safety committees; 
- safety documentation, including a Safety Report; 
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- reporting of incidents; 
- arrangements for dealing with accidents or emergencies; 
- staff training; and 
- arrangements for reviewing and up-dating 
procedures and safety related documentation. 
operating 
511. Separation of Licence Conditions: The formal licence to 
construct or operate a nuclear installation (see paras. 502-504} 
is likely to require fewer changes during the lifetime of the 
installation than the conditions attached to it, many of which may 
be of a technical nature and subject to periodic up-dating. 
Separating the conditions in the form of an attachment or 
appendage to the licence, rather than as an integral part of it, 
can prove an advantage, 
approving proposed changes 
more lengthy and taken at 
particularly where the procedures for 
to the formal licence are likely to be 
a higher level than those relating to 
changes in the licence conditions. In general, the more extensive 
and detailed the licence conditions, the greater the advantage in 
separating them from the formal licence. 
512. Several Installations on a Single Site: Where several 
nuclear installations are located on a single site, there may be a 
further advantage in licensing the site as a whole, rather than on 
the basis of individual installations. This may simplify the 
overall licensing arrangements by, for example, enabling those 
activities that may be common to all installations on the site 
(such as radiological protection and emergency response 
arrangements) to be treated as an entity. Conditions that are 
specific to individual installations on the site, such as plant 
operating rules, can be grouped separately within the licence for 
application to the particular installation to which they apply. 
Alternatively, there may be situations where separate licences are 
preferable, so that different conditions can be applied to each 
individual plant. In such cases, care must be taken to ensure 
that plant that is common t.o the installation as a whole can be 
adequately controlled. 
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MAINTAINING EFFECTIVE LICENSING ARRANGEMENTS 
513. Revision or Modification of Licence Conditions: The 
achievement of a high level of nuclear safety must continue to be 
a live issue throughout all stages in the life of a nuclear 
installation. In support of this, the regulatory arrangements 
should provide for the licence conditions to be revised or 
modified as circumstances and safety related experience dictate, 
and as the results of technological progress or of nuclear safety 
research and development become available. Any such revisions or 
modifications, including those that may be requested by the 
licensee, should always be subject to the formal agreement of the 
regulatory organisation. By incorporating provisions into the 
licensing arrangements for amending, adding or revoking the 
licence and/or conditions at any time that it considers necessary 
in the interests of safety, the regulatory organisation should be 
able to maintain a flexible but rigorous control over a licensee's 
safety related activities. 
514. Provision for Controls: Provision may need to be made for 
exercising other forms of control in regulating for the safe 
operation of an installation. In particular: 
(i) Agreement to Carry Out a Safety Related Activity: 
Where a particular safety related activity is not already 
subject to licence conditions, a licensee may need to be 
precluded from carrying out the activity until he has 
satisfied the regulatory organisation that it is safe to do 
so and has received its formal agreement that the activity 
may proceed. 
(ii) Submission for Approval of Proposed Arrangements: 
Where issues of particular safety significance are involved, 
the regulatory organisation may require the licensee to 
submit in writing, and for its formal approval, his proposed 
arrangements for meeting the relevant condition of the 
licence, or carrying out the relevant activity. Following 
such approval, the licensee would be precluded from changing 
the arrangements or procedures without a resubmission to the 
regulatory organisation. 
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(iii) Instruction to Take Safety Related Action: 
The regulatory organisation may consider it necessary to 
intervene where matters of particular safety concern are 
identified, and to instruct the licensee to implement 
appropriate remedial measures. Any such intervention 
should be based on an assessment of the seriousness of the 
identified situation and of the urgency for remedial 
action. For example: 
Urgent Safety Related Actions: Where an identified 
situation is considered to pose an immediate safety risk 
and require urgent remedial action, the licensee should be 
instructed forthwith to take the appropriate measures for 
returning the installation to a safe state. This may 
include shutting down the plant and maintaining it in a 
safe condition until the regulatory organisation is 
satisfied that it is safe to restart, and has given its 
formal consent to the licensee. 
Non-Urgent Safety Related Actions: Where a situation is 
identified that, although not posing an immediate risk to 
safety, does require remedial action to be taken without 
undue delay, the licensee should be instructed to implement 
the agreed remedial measures within a time scale that 
reflects the seriousness of the situation. 
Long-Term Safety Related Requirements: Where problems are 
identified that, although not of immediate safety 
importance, may have significance in the longer term (for 
example, progressivE~ embrittlement of pressure circuit 
welds) , the regulatory organisation should place a formal 
requirement on the licensee to submit proposals for 
remedying the situation within a specified time (eg, all 
remedial work to be completed within 2 years). The 
proposed time scale should be commensurate with the 
seriousness of the problem, the need to complete any 
rectification work before it can pose a significant risk to 
the safety of the installation, and the extent of the work 
involved. 
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(iv) Ensuring Qualified and Experienced Plant 
regulatory organisation should require 
organisation to ensure that, where 
Operators: The 
the operating 
safety related 
requirements dictate, specific tasks are only carried out by 
operators having specific qualifications and experience. 
PRESCRIPTIVE AND NON-PRESCRIPTIVE ARRANGEMENTS 
515. Prescriptive Regulation: In the prescriptive approach to the 
regulation of nuclear safety, the regulatory organisation 
specifies all of the safety related requirements that a licensee 
must meet, usually in the form of detailed statutory regulations 
and supportive provisions. Although, compared with a non-
prescriptive regime, a highly prescriptive approach to regulation 
may simplify the regulatory inspection process and be less 
demanding in terms of the qualifications and experience required 
of its regulatory inspection staff, it can also prove counter-
productive. For example, because it places the emphasis upon 
detailed written regulations and provisions to cover all aspects 
of safety, the result may be to reduce the effective dialogue 
between those responsible for regulatory inspection and the 
licensee. It may also limit a licensee's flexibility to meet the 
statutory requirements placed upon him in the most efficient and 
effective manner, thereby resulting in significant additional 
operating costs. Similarly, the licensee may be deterred from 
seeking additional safety benefits, in that having fully complied 
with a specific safety related regulation, he may have no further 
legal obligation to attempt an even greater improvement in the 
level of safety, even though it may have been practicable to 
achieve, and would have been a requirement, had the concept of 
ALARA been applied. 
516. It should also be recognised that the more prescriptive the 
regulatory approach, the greater the effort that will be needed by 
the regulatory organisation to define and disseminate unambiguous 
requirements that will not become the subject of interpretation 
and confusion for the licensee. Moreover, the development of a 
highly prescriptive approach can place a heavy demand on 
regulatory resources. It is likely to be more costjresource 
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effective, therefore, when applied in a country that is planning 
or operating a relatively large nuclear power programme, where 
there is 1 ikely to be a correspondingly large regulatory staff, 
and where the regulations can be applied generically to a majority 
of the installations to be licensed. 
517. Non-Prescriptive Regulation: In contrast to the prescriptive 
approach of specifying in detail what a licensee should do in 
every particular circumstance, the licence conditions can be used 
to define areas where special attention will need to be paid in 
the interests of safety. Adopting this approach allows a licensee 
to develop his own arrangements, depending upon, and specific to, 
the particular circumstances of his operations. Thus, although he 
remains responsible for the initiation and application of detailed 
safety standards and safe procedures for his installation, he is 
able to exercise his responsibility for safety without being 
unduly constrained by specifically prescribed requirements. The 
licence conditions, whether issued as an integral part of the 
licence or as supportive safety related requirements, can, 
therefore, be used to provide a basis for overall safety control 
of the installation in relation to its potential impact upon 
workers on the site, the public, and the environment. 
518. In either the prescriptive or the non-prescriptive approach 
to licensing, any safety related conditions issued in support of 
the nuclear licence do not, per se, ensure safety, nor do they 
relieve the licensee of his responsibility for safety, including 
the safety of his plant. 
519. Further guidance on nuclear licences and on the manner in 
which safety related conditions are issued in support of the 
licensing and regulation of nuclear installations are given in 
Refs.18, 20 and 23. 
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6. ASSESSMENT 
Relevant Fundamental Safety Principles: 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 
15, 16, 22, 23, 24, 25. 
601. Safety assessment in relation to the licensing and regulatory 
control of nuclear installations encompasses the systematic 
critical examination of the safety analysis carried out by the 
operating organisation and of the Safety Report submitted in 
support of the licence application. This safety case should apply 
to those structures, systems and components that have a bearing 
either directly or indirectly on the safety of the installation. 
It should cover the various ways they might fail to operate as 
designed, or their integrity might be affected, and the resultant 
consequences. The purpose of safety assessment is to identify any 
underlying design or operational weaknesses. 
602. Before a licence is granted for the construction or operation 
of a nuclear installation, the regulatory organisation will need 
to assess the acceptability of the licence applicant's written 
formal proposals, using either its own assessment staff or its 
nominated external consultants specialising in particular fields 
of technology. It needs to be satisfied that at all stages 
throughout the life of the proposed installation, and during its 
decommissioning, the safety criteria of the regulatory 
organisation will be met, that the installation will not present 
an unacceptable risk to persons on the site or to the public, and 
that it will not result in an unacceptable environmental impact. 
REGULATORY ASSESSMENT RESPONSIBILITIES 
603. Commencement of Assessment: The more detailed procedures for 
licensing a nuclear installation will vary from country to 
country. However, good practice dictates that the review and 
assessment of the site characteristics and of the design of the 
installation, together with the collection and collation of siting 
and environmental data, should be commenced well in advance of the 
date upon which the licence is required to come into force. 
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604. Assessment Areas: The general area of safety assessment can 
be sub-divided to cover both generic and site-specific tasks 
relating to: 
- the safety assessment of new installations; 
- periodic reassessment of the safety case; 
- plant modifications at existing installations; 
- assessment of plant operating and maintenance proposals; 
- the safety assessment of ageing plant; 
- the decommissioning safety case; and 
- assessment and periodic reassessment of the emergency 
response arrangements. 
605. Assessment Arrangements: In practice, and particularly 1n 
the case of a large assessment programme, the arrangements for 
carrying out assessments tend to be dealt with on a discipline 
oriented basis, with further sub-divisions covering, for example, 
fault analysis, seismology, thermal hydraulics, reactor physics, 
electrical engineering, mechanical engineering (including pressure 
vessel design), civil and construction engineering, chemical 
engineering, instrumentation and control engineering, radiological 
protection, human factors, and quality assurance. This, in turn, 
will require those working in these various sub-divisions to have 
adequate in-depth experience and specialist knowledge of the 
particular discipline to which their assessment work relates. 
606. When carrying out a safety assessment for a particular 
installation, and to guard against incompatibilities occurring 
across plant interfaces, the results of the different analyses and 
their related findings should be assessed to ensure that, 
together, they present a fully integrated system of safety at the 
plant level. The results of all reviews, analyses and assessments 
should be documented in detail to facilitate independent audit of 
the scope, depth and conclusions of the examination. 
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ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE 
607. Design Assessment: The regulatory organisation should carry 
out a thorough assessment of the licence applicant's submissions 
to determine whether the siting proposals, design of the 
installation and the proposed operating limits and procedures meet 
the regulatory organisation's safety objectives and criteria. To 
do so it will need to acquire a thorough understanding of the 
design of the installation and the manner in which the plant, as 
an entity, is expected to behave, particularly in relation to: 
- the underlying safety concepts upon which it is based; 
- the quality assurance provisions that will support the 
installation throughout its design, construction, 
commissioning, operation and eventual decommissioning; 
- the operating principles and control parameters proposed by 
the licence applicant. 
- the provisions made for the minimisation, safe handling, 
accumulation, discharge or disposal of any radioactive 
wastes arising throughout the life of the installation, or 
as a result of its decommissioning. 
608. Design Assessment Procedure: The design assessment procedure 
should proceed from a broad-based survey of the installation as a 
whole, to a more detailed review of individual plant units and an 
in-depth assessment of how individual systems, structures and 
components will perform under normal operation, anticipated 
operational occurrences and accident conditions. It should be 
ascertained that the design is based on proven technologies 
(including those proven by experiment) and that it incorporates 
the principle of 'defence in depth', with the release of 
radioactive material being restrained by several levels of 
protection and multiple barriers. Emphasis should be placed on 
those items of particular relevance to maintaining safety during 
normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences, and on 
regaining safe plant conditions following an accident, taking into 
account the capabilities and limitations of human performance. 
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The proposed radioactive waste management arrangements should also 
be considered, including the need to meet any international 
commitments in relation to discharges or disposal. 
609. Provision of Relevant Information: To support its assessment 
process, the regulatory organisation should establish and maintain 
a system for obtaining from a licence applicant all documentation, 
including safety reports, that it considers necessary for 
assessing the safety, technical feasibility, accuracy and 
compliance with any statutory requirements, of the applicants 
proposals. Through a systematic and rigorous process of 
examination, supported where appropriate by independent design 
checks, by analytical methods and calculations, and by 
inspections, the regulatory organisation should satisfy itself 
that its requirements have been met, and in particular, that: 
- the licence applicant has provided all the information 
that the regulatory assessors or their consultants deem 
necessary for carrying out their review and assessment; 
the information presented in the reports is accurate and 
complies with the requirements of any applicable rules and 
regulations; 
- the engineering solutions proposed, and particularly any 
novel solutions, are feasible in the light of current 
technology, and capable of achieving the design safety 
objectives. 
610. Where the regulatory organisation considers that a submission 
does not fully satisfy its safety objectives, the licence 
applicant should be required to either rework its safety 
justification, or make appropriate modifications, and re-submit 
the proposals for further assessment. 
611. Impact on Licence Conditions: Following the regulatory 
organisation's initial design safety analysis and assessment, the 
first formal licensing action may well be its approval of the 
design safety concept and the issue of a construction licence. 
Proceeding to subsequent stages in the construction, commissioning 
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and initial operation of the installation may be subject to 
relevant upgradings or changes to the nuclear licence, or to the 
safety related conditions with which the licensee must comply. 
These may be required in order that any revised state of the plant 
or results of more detailed and up-dated plant safety assessments 
can be taken into account. 
612. Assessment Throughout Installation Lifetime: In addition to 
the initial review and assessment of a licence applicant's 
proposals, the regulatory organisation should develop a systematic 
programme of review and assessment appropriate to, and applicable 
at each stage in the development and life of an installation, from 
design and construction, through to final decommissioning. As 
part of this programme, the regulatory organisation should 
establish a schedule for the formal submission by the licence 
applicant/licensee of supporting documentation (including relevant 
safety analyses and up-dated Safety Reports) at each stage in the 
licensing of the installation. 
613. Assessment Prior to Resumption of Operation: The regulatory 
organisation should also establish formal arrangements (including 
specifying the supporting safety documentation to be submitted by 
the licensee) for assessing whether an installation may be 
permitted to resume normal operation following a major plant shut-
down, such as that due to annual maintenance, plant modification, 
core reloading, etc. 
614. Quality Assurance: Where appropriate, during the 
construction or any modification of the plant, the licensee should 
be required to conduct quality assurance audits of its 
manufacturers, suppliers and sub-contractors to verify and provide 
evidence to the regulatory organisation of their qualification for 
nuclear related work. The prime purpose of these arrangements is 
to ensure that the quality and performance required by the 
regulatory organisation are achieved by the licensee at all stages 
in the life of the nuclear installation. In this respect, they 
should complement the regulatory organisation's own review and 
assessment of the licensee's activities. 
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615. Further guidance on assessment, and examples of assessment 
arrangements, are given in Refs. 19, 20, 24, 25, 26 and 27. 
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7. INSPECTION 
Relevant Fundamental Safety Principles: 1, 3, 16. 
701. Inspection is the means by which the regulatory organisation 
satisfies itself that a licensee is complying with the licence 
conditions, and with any criteria relating to the safe operation 
of the plant as set out in the licensee's safety submission, 
including the formal Safety Report. Effective inspection 
arrangements should provide for the systematic verification of 
plant and operational safety, the identification of any failure to 
meet regulatory requirements, and the initiation of appropriate 
enforcement action against the licensee to remedy the situation. 
INSPECTION ARRANGEMENTS 
702. Organisation: For any particular country, the manner in 
which activities within the inspection 
depend, largely, upon the size of the 
geographical location of the nuclear 
area are organised will 
nuclear programme, the 
installations and any 
inspection and enforcement procedures already established for non-
nuclear plant. Task-related sub-divisions within the functional 
area of inspection will tend to be dictated by the size of the 
nuclear power programme and the range of installations to be 
licensed. Where, at any one time, the regulatory organisation is 
responsible for the inspection of installations under 
construction, in operation, and being decommissioned, there may 
also be an advantage in further sub-dividing on this basis. Any 
sub-division should aim at making the best use of the specialist 
expertise available within the regulatory organisation. However, 
it is essential for the regulatory organisation to maintain a 
consistent approach when implementing its inspection arrangements; 
care should be exercised, therefore, that this is not jeopardised 
by any sub-division of these arrangements or of inspection duties. 
703. 'Regional' and 'Resident• Inspection: When establishing its 
inspection arrangements, the regulatory organisation will need to 
decide whether inspectors should be centrally based, (eg, at the 
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regulatory organisation's headquarters), or whether the distances, 
geographical locations, or national sub-divisions (eg, into 
states, counties, etc.) dictate the establishment of regional 
inspection groups. Any requirement for "resident" inspectors at 
particular installations or groups of installations must also be 
determined. Decisions relating to these requirements should take 
into account specific circumstances, established national practice 
and the inherent advantages and disadvantages of the different 
inspection arrangements. The provision of adequate communication 
arrangements between the regulatory organisation's headquarters 
and its inspectors is of paramount importance. Moreover, for 
those inspectors who are based at regional offices or at 
particular installations, it. is essential that effective links 
with the headquarters organisation for the provision of technical 
support are maintained on a permanent basis. 
704. Where the regulatory arrangements require an inspector to act 
as a focal point for any discussion between the regulatory 
organisation and the licensee, the inspector should ensure that he 
is kept aware of all regulatory inspection activities relating to 
the installation, including any necessary inspection of 
manufacturers, suppliers and sub-contractors. 
705. Inspection Programme: The regulatory organisation should 
establish arrangements for the formal inspection of all licensed 
nuclear installations by suitably qualified and trained inspectors 
and for the enforcement of any licence conditions or regulatory 
requirements with which the licensee must comply. In support of 
these arrangements, it should develop a programme to assure itself 
that: 
- all nuclear installations are constructed and operated in 
conformity with the designs and safety procedures approved 
by the regulatory organisation; 
- all of an installation's safety related structures, 
components and systems are of the required quality; 
- those who will operate the installation are competent to do 
so in a safe manner; 
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- the installation is operated within the limits agreed with 
the regulatory organisation and in accordance with the 
conditions specified in the licence; 
- any deficiencies that may be of safety significance are 
corrected by the licensee without undue delay and notified 
to the regulatory organisation; and 
- any necessary enforcement action is, primarily, directed at 
the licensee as a corporate organisation. 
706. Types of Inspection Visits: The programme of inspection 
should include both announced and unannounced inspection visits. 
It should continue throughout all stages of the licensing process, 
from the commencement of construction to completion of 
decommissioning. There should also be built-in allowances for 
reactive inspections in response to particular situations such as 
post-maintenance start-up and plant incidents. When determining a 
specific plant inspection programme the operational experience of 
the particular plant should be taken into consideration. Although 
the depth of attention paid to any specific item should be 
determined by its relative importance to safety, it should be 
recognised that there is not necessarily any sharp dividing line 
between safety and non-safety related equipment and processes. 
707. Frequency of Inspection: The time scale over which a 
complete cycle of regulatory inspections aimed at assessing 
compliance with licence conditions is carried out should be as 
short as is reasonably practicable. The actual frequency of 
inspection for any particular type of installation should be 
determined by the policy of the regulatory organisation and the 
resources available to it. The frequency of routine inspections 
accorded any particular plant item or procedure should reflect its 
relevant safety significance. Compliance with key safety 
parameters, such as plant operating limits, should be verified at 
each inspection visit and include the inspection of relevant 
operating records. 
708. Access to Site: It is essential that designated inspectors 
have freedom of access to all plant, equipment, documentation 
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(including drawings, operating logs, radiological protection 
records, etc.) and personnel on the licensed site. The licensee 
and his staff must be aware of the need to meet these 
requirements. Never-the-less, the regulatory organisation should 
recognise that the licensee's management, particularly at plant 
level, is the primary channel through which it should acquire 
formal information. An inspector should use his regulatory powers 
with discretion; unnecessary interference with plant operations or 
the work of plant staff should be avoided. Except when the urgent 
pursuance of his regulatory duties makes it impracticable, an 
inspector should be required to comply at all times with any site 
safety rules and requirements. 
709. Inspection Guidelines: To ensure that the programmed 
inspections are carried out in a systematic and consistent manner, 
the regulatory organisation should develop inspection guide-lines. 
These should be aimed at assessing the current safety status of 
the plant and the manner in which it is being operated, 
identifying any matters of safety significance (including the 
potential for any impact upon plant workers, the public or the 
environment) and gauging the effectiveness with which the licensee 
manages the safety of his plant. The guide-lines should provide 
sufficient flexibility for inspectors to take the initiative in 
identifying and addressing any new matters of concern as they 
arise. 
710. Post-Inspection Actions: Informal discussions on plant 
conditions held during the course of an inspection visit should be 
summarised in a formal discussion between the inspector and an 
appropriate representative of the licensee's plant management 
before completion of the visit. Following an inspection, and as 
part of its regulatory inspection arrangements the regulatory 
organisation should: 
- establish a structured procedure for the evaluation and 
systematic follow-up of all inspection findings, both 
normal and those indicating any non-compliance with licence 
conditions; 
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- formalise the results of each inspection as soon as 
practicable after its completion by means of a protocol, 
letter or report, with copies, as appropriate, to the 
licensee; 
- evaluate and, where appropriate, assess the inspection 
report, identifying any underlying causes and generic 
issues for subsequent follow-up action; 
- ensure that the relevant information is fed back to the 
licensee without delay for the initiation of any necessary 
corrective measures; and 
- arrange for inspection and assessment staff associated with 
various installations or projects to meet periodically to 
exchange views and discuss the findings and issues raised 
in their reports. 
THE NUCLEAR INSTALLATION INSPECTOR 
711. Regulatory Inspectors: The role of the regulatory inspector 
demands a high level of technical expertise and in-depth 
experience relating to a range of subject areas. It also demands 
a high level of personal integrity, coupled with the ability to 
discuss technical and safety related issues with senior plant 
management on a basis of professional mutual respect. 
712. Use of Designated Regulatory Inspectors: Depending upon 
national arrangements, inspection may be carried out by a pool of 
regulatory staff, or by designating particular inspectors to be 
responsible for one or more specific installations, or by some 
combination of these arrangements. Where resources permit, it is 
generally more effective, from a regulatory viewpoint, to have one 
or more designated inspectors responsible for each particular 
installation. This not only enables the designated inspector to 
acquire an in-depth knowledge of the installation for which he is 
responsible, but also to establish the necessary rapport with 
management and staff that will enable him to determine whether it 
is being managed and operated in a safety conscious manner. 
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713. Independence of the Regulatory Inspector: Whatever the 
inspection arrangements, it is essential that regulatory staff, 
and particularly those allocated to inspection, maintain their 
independence by adopting a professional detachment with regard to 
plant performance and operational problems when carrying out their 
duties. This independence by the regulatory organisation must be 
recognisable at all times. There should be no significant 
reliance upon the operating organisation/licensee to provide the 
facilities or services necessary for the effective conduct of an 
inspector's work. Never-the-less, to enable the regulatory 
inspection functions to be carried out in an effective and 
efficient manner, to the extent possible and consistent with good 
inspection practice, there should be close co-operation with the 
licensee. 
714. Rotation of Inspector's Duties: To ensure that an 
inspector's professional det:achment is not jeopardised, and to 
enable him to broaden his experience, there should be a limit on 
the time that an inspector is assigned to any particular 
installation, preferably not more than a few years. To the extent 
practicable, the experience of regulatory staff should be 
broadened by rotating their duties between inspection and other 
regulatory functions, including those carried out at the 
regulatory organisation's headquarters. Where an inspector has 
been recruited from the operating organisation or a licensee, it 
is preferable that he should not be given immediate inspection 
responsibility for any installation at which he has recently been 
employed, and in any case, not until he has completed his 
induction training and sufficiently assimilated regulatory 
practices to enable him to effectively maintain his independence. 
715. Staffing: In principle, the extent of any national nuclear 
regulatory inspection programme should be dictated by the need to 
verify that nuclear installations continue to be operated in a 
safe manner. Sufficient staff should, therefore, be assigned by 
the regulatory organisation to inspection duties to ensure that 
the on-going inspection programme can not only be maintained, but 
that there will be a sufficient margin for dealing with any 
contingencies that may arise. Should the regulatory organisation 
decide to utilise the services of consultants to assist with its 
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inspection programme, it should recognise that their use does not 
diminish its own responsibility. 
716. Resident Inspectors: Where 'resident' inspectors are 
attached to installations, the regulatory organisation should 
ensure that they do not become isolated, preferably by allocating 
more than one inspector to an installation to provide for mutual 
support. All inspection staff, including resident inspectors, 
should participate in reviews and audits at installations other 
than those to which they are normally assigned, in order to 
strengthen their inspection capability and broaden their 
regulatory perspective. 
717. Local Inspection Office: In those cases where inspectors are 
resident at a nuclear installation there may be a major benefit in 
establishing a local office for their exclusive use, where 
reasoned discussion and decision making can take place in an 
environment away from the day to day site pressures. The office 
should be located outside the boundary of the relevant site, 
preferably within a convenient distance for ready access to the 
site. It should be adequately equipped with modern communications 
facilities, including telephone, facsimile and computer terminal 
links with the regulatory organisation's headquarters. 
718. Maintaining Effective Inspection Arrangements: It is 
essential that inspection staff have a broadly based, 
comprehensive understanding of the safety issues underlying the 
policy and decisions of the regulatory organisation. To this end, 
arrangements should be made for them to have regular contact with 
the regulatory headquarters safety assessment staff in a working 
environment away from the day to day site pressures. This is 
especially important for inspectors who are resident at a 
particular site, or attached to a regional office. They should 
also have access to specialists, either within the regulatory 
organisation or outside consultants, who can provide in-depth 
advice in particular areas of technology. In some cases, 
specialists may also need to participate with the inspector in the 
on-site inspection and in the subsequent evaluation of inspection 
findings. All of these considerations and requirements will need 
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to be taken into account when establishing the regulatory 
inspection arrangements. 
719. Further guidance on inspection, and examples of inspection 
arrangements, is given in Refs.18, 19, 20 and 28. 
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8. REGULATORY COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 
Relevant Fundamental Safety Principles: 3, 21. 
801. Responsibility for the reporting of any non-compliance with 
regulatory requirements rests, in the first instance, with the 
licensee. Enforcement is the legal action initiated by the 
regulatory organisation against the licensee with the intention of 
correcting and, as appropriate, penalising non-compliance with the 
regulatory requirements. The legislative arrangements referred to 
in Section 3 should provide for adequate powers to effectively 
enforce the licence conditions and to require the licensee to 
carry out any other actions that the regulatory organisation 
considers necessary in the interests of safety. These provisions 
should be in addition to the dynamic system of licence controls 
for enabling the licence conditions to be revised or modified as 
circumstances and safety experience dictate, as discussed in 
Section 5. 
COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ARRANGEMENTS 
802. Responsibility for Reporting Safety Violations: It should be 
a legal responsibility for the licensee to report to the 
regulatory organisation, in accordance with pre-established 
procedures and arrangements, safety related incidents, non-
compliance with licence conditions, or other breaches of 
regulatory requirements of which he is aware. The licensee should 
also be responsible for taking prompt and appropriate action to 
remedy the situation and return the installation to a safe state. 
Such action should be initiated without waiting for any formal 
directive from the regulatory organisation. However, the licensee 
remains responsible for implementing any further measures the 
regulatory organisation may consider necessary in the interests of 
safety. 
803. Establishing Response Procedures: To ensure that safety 
violations or breaches of licence conditions can be dealt with 
effectively and with minimum delay, the regulatory organisation 
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should establish criteria and internal procedures for responding 
to identified deficiencies in plant operations, safety 
documentation or safety management. These procedures should 
include identification of the supervisory level at which formal 
regulatory response should be initiated with the licensee, and the 
range and nature of the enforcement actions that may be applied, 
especially those involving curtailment of activities, plant shut-
down, monetary fines, or other punitive actions, in the event of 
non-compliance. 
804. The response by the regulator should normally proceed from 
discussions with plant management or written requests for 
explanations, through succeeding stages such as directives, 
restrictions on operations or amendment of licence conditions, 
culminating as a final resort in legal action, suspension of 
operation and financial penal ties. Commensurate with the safety 
importance of the identified deficiency, the objective should be 
to achieve mutual agreement, at the lowest possible authoritative 
level, on the action to be taken to remedy the situation. 
805. Graded Enforcement Action: The severity of the enforcement 
action taken by the regulatory organisation should be so graded as 
to reflect the safety significance of the particular breach of 
licence conditions, or the failure to meet particular regulatory 
requirements, and should take into account the licensee's previous 
safety record. The enforcement action may include placing 
appropriate constraints upon the licensee, for example, by 
limiting or restricting particular plant operations or by making 
effective use of the regulatory organisation's powers for 
authorising the restart of the plant following shut-down. 
806. Initiation of Legal Action: In the event of any safety 
violation, the regulatory authority will need to decide whether to 
instigate legal proceedings against the licensee, including 
prosecution through the courts. The nature and extent of any 
legal action taken will depend upon the seriousness of the 
violation and on the particular national legislative provisions. 
These provisions should enable a licensee to be prosecuted through 
the courts in response to any deliberate and significant breach of 
licence conditions, operating rules, operating safety limits, or 
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non-compliance with regulatory requirements. In general, any 
penalty imposed by the court should be directed at the licensee 1 
operating organisation as a body, rather than at individuals 
within the organisation, except when such individuals are guilty 
of deliberate and major misdemeanours or criminal actions. It 
should be recognised that the need to take legal action, 
irrespective of any penalty imposed, indicates a failure in the 
pursuance of an effective nuclear safety policy. However, the 
penalty does not, in itself, resolve the root cause of the 
failure. This must be examined separately and positive measures 
implemented to ensure that there will be no recurrence. 
807. Authority of the Regulatory Inspector: It is important that 
the degree of authority vested in the regulatory inspector be 
fully understood, both by the regulator and the licensee. Some 
countries have found it an advantage to provide the inspector with 
the authority to direct a licensee to take immediate corrective 
actions (including curtailment of the particular activity should 
this be considered necessary) if, in the inspector's judgement, 
there is imminent and significant risk to the health and safety of 
persons on the site or of the public, or to the environment. 
Other countries require such enforcement decisions to be taken at 
a more senior level within the regulatory organisation. In this 
latter case, the promptness with which the relevant information is 
received, and the regulatory response is determined and 
transmitted to the licensee, should reflect the urgency of the 
situation and enable actions to be implemented in adequate time to 
prevent any further significant deterioration in safety. 
RESPONDING TO SAFETY RELATED INCIDENTS 
808. Incident Spectrum: Safety analyses and operating experience 
indicate that there is a continuous spectrum of safety related 
incidents that may occur at nuclear installations. This can range 
from minor events or abnormal occurrences that have no direct 
influence on the safety of the plant, nor present any significant 
radiological hazard to site personnel or the public, to serious 
accidents that involve the release of radioactive materials to the 
environment. As with breaches of regulatory requirements, the 
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response required of the licensee should be graded to reflect the 
degree of severity of the particular incident, as should the 
reporting and recording arrangements that the licensee is required 
to make. 
809. Response of the Regulatory Organisation: The response of the 
regulatory organisation should also reflect the seriousness of the 
incident. If it is of a more minor nature, the incident may only 
come to the attention of the regulatory organisation during a site 
inspection visit; provided the licensee has already taken 
appropriate remedial action and rectified the situation, no 
further action may be necessary. Where the situation has not been 
rectified, the regulatory inspector should bring it to the 
attention of the site management without delay and, if possible, 
the remedial action and time-table for its implementation should 
be agreed. In the case of more serious incidents, the regulatory 
organisation may need to issue instructions, or even direct the 
licensee, to take immediate remedial action, which may include 
suspending operation. In the extreme case of an accident 
involving, or having the potential for, the release of radioactive 
materials, it may be necessary to implement the emergency response 
arrangements. 
810. Investigation by the Regulatory Organisation: The regulatory 
organisation should also determine at what level of incident it 
needs to carry out a detailed investigation. Should an 
investigation be considered necessary, the regulatory organisation 
will need to decide whether it is sufficient for this to be done 
by a single inspector or if the seriousness and extent of the 
consequences of the incident are such that a broader based 
investigation is more appropriate. The analysis of the incident, 
and of the consequences of any remedial actions proposed by the 
licensee, may also require regulatory assessment effort. In the 
extreme, the conclusions of the regulatory organisation may be 
that legal action should be taken against the licensee. Examples 
of response actions by the regulatory organisation and the 
licensee to different incident levels are given in the following 
paragraphs. 
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IMPLEMENTING COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ARRANGEMENTS 
811. Significant Safety Related Incidents: During the life of a 
nuclear installation, safety related incidents may occur that, in 
the judgement of the regulatory organisation, could result in a 
significant hazard to persons on the site, to the public, or to 
the environment. Their occurrence may be brought to the attention 
of the regulatory organisation as the result of inspection of the 
installation, or by the licensee or other person. Where such 
breaches of safety are identified in the course of inspection, the 
inspector should immediately bring the matter to the attention of 
the site manager (as the most senior representative of the 
licensee) and report the situation to the regulatory organisation 
headquarters. 
812. Should time permit, the regulatory organisation should issue 
a written warning to the licensee, specifying the nature and 
regulatory basis of the alleged breach and, if appropriate 
remedial action has not already been implemented, directing the 
licensee to do so, specifying the period within which the action 
must completed. If the seriousness of the incident demands a more 
urgent response, the regulatory organisation, either directly 
through its headquarters organisation, or through the inspector, 
should immediately direct the licensee to curtail the relevant 
activities associated with the occurrence and ensure that the 
plant is put into a safe state. 
813. A similar approach should apply where an occurrence is drawn 
to the attention of the regulatory organisation, other than as the 
result of inspection. In this case, there may be an urgent need 
to send regulatory staff, including the responsible inspector, to 
the installation in order to appraise the situation and determine 
any necessary remedial measures, before specifying further safety 
related actions to be taken by the licensee. 
814. Return to Normal Operation: With the plant in a safe 
condition, the licensee should submit the remedial measures it 
proposes to implement, and the time scale for their completion, to 
the regulatory organisation for its agreement. Following its 
assessment and agreement to the proposals, the regulatory 
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organisation should stipulate the conditions to be satisfied 
before the installation will be permitted to return to normal 
operation. Should the regulatory organisation consider it 
appropriate to provide guidance to the licensee on the nature of 
the remedial action it would wish to see undertaken, it must make 
it clear that the adoption of such guidance does not in any way 
diminish the responsibility of the licensee for any remedial 
action taken or for the safe operation of his installation. 
815. Notification to Cease Operation: In the case of a serious 
plant accident, particularly if it results in, or could have 
resulted in, a significant uncontrolled release of radioactive 
material into the environment, the regulatory organisation should 
decide whether, in the interests of safety, the licensee should be 
directed to permanently cease operation. A similar approach 
should be considered in response to persistent serious breaches of 
licence conditions. When notifying the licensee of any such 
decision, it should be made clear that the operating organisation 
will continue to retain full responsibility for the safety of the 
installation, including any consequences of its radiological 
impact upon site personnel, the public and the environment, until 
the installation has been safely dismantled and decommissioned, 
and the regulatory authority has revoked the licence. 
816. Maintaining Adequate Records: Formal records of all 
significant safety related incidents and accidents should be 
maintained by the regulatory organisation, together with any 
directives issued to the licensee, and any response or remedial 
actions taken. The licensee should also be required to maintain 
appropriate records. Where the seriousness of any incident or 
accident may result in legal proceedings being taken against the 
licensee by the regulatory organisation, the recording of actions 
related to their instigation should be separate from those 
relating to the reinstatement of plant safety. Should the 
consequences of a major plant incident or accident result in 
subsequent compensation claims from those who consider they have 
been harmed or have suffered financial loss, including members of 
the public, the availability of detailed and accurate records 
relating to the occurrence will be of particular importance. 
- 60-
817. Further guidance on compliance and enforcement arrangements, 
is given in Refs.8, 9, 18 and 28. 
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9. REGULATORY LIAISON 
901. Although the prime responsibility for the monitoring and 
enforcement of nuclear safety rests with the regulatory 
organisation, if it is to carry out its duties effectively it will 
need to maintain a close liaison with other relevant governmental 
organisations, national advisory bodies, and the operating 
organisation/licensee. It should also keep abreast of nuclear 
safety developments world-wide by establishing effective links 
with relevant international and inter-governmental organisations. 
The main liaison requirements are considered in this Section. 
LIAISON WITH GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS 
902. In most countries, national 
environmental protection, occupational 
responsibilities 
and public health 
safety, safe transport, agriculture and foodstuffs, 
for 
and 
water 
resources, electrical power supplies, civil protection, etc. are 
located within specific governmental organisations. A number of 
these will have responsibilities at national, regional and local 
levels that relate directly or indirectly to nuclear safety 
matters; for example, radiological protection, pressure vessel 
integrity, emergency services, planning and control of land 
utilisation, transport of hazardous materials, etc. To ensure 
that the particular responsibilities, legislative requirements and 
advice of these governmental organisations are taken into account 
in the overall nuclear safety arrangements, it is essential that 
an effective liaison is established and maintained between them 
and the regulatory organisation. 
903. The liaison arrangements should be established at an early 
stage in the planning of the first nuclear installation and should 
continue in force, as appropriate, until all installations have 
been successfully decommissioned. In practice, they should 
facilitate cooperation between the regulatory organisation and 
other concerned governmental organisations at the national, 
regional and local levels. Any relevant responsibilities of these 
organisations, including those of a statutory nature, should be 
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taken into account by the regulatory organisation when assessing 
the licensee's proposals for the safe operation of his 
installation. In particular, this should cover their role and 
responsibilities in responding to an accident, including the 
provision of emergency services and the introduction of remedial 
measures for the protection of the public in the event of a 
release of radioactive materials into the environment. 
904. Examples of liaison between the regulatory organisation and 
other governmental organisations are given in Refs.18, 19, 20, 21 
and 22. 
LIAISON WITH THE OPERATING ORGANISATION 
905. During all stages of the licensing process, from the initial 
pre-licensing discussions through to completion of decommissioning 
and final de-licensing of the installation, a close liaison 
between the regulatory and operating organisations is an essential 
element in the safe regulation of a nuclear installation. At the 
preliminary stage of the licensing process the operating 
organisation should provide the regulatory organisation with all 
relevant information (including that obtained from the design, 
engineering, and other support organisations) upon which to base a 
decision as to whether or not the proposed installation can be 
licensed (see Section 6). Similarly, for each stage in the 
licensing process, the operating organisation (which will include, 
where appropriate, the licensee) should be aware of the regulatory 
requirements that will have to be satisfied before permission is 
granted to proceed to the next stage. This exchange of 
information, and hence the regulatory process itself, is enhanced 
when the regulatory authority and the operating organisation are 
able to interact in an atmosphere of mutual confidence and 
respect. 
906. The regulatory organisation should ensure that arrangements 
for providing an effective liaison between the two organisations, 
both at the headquarters and plant level, are jointly developed 
and in place at the earliest possible stage. Without diminishing 
the independence of the two organisations or detracting from their 
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responsibilities, these arrangements should provide for both 
formal and informal channels of communication at appropriate 
levels of seniority within their respective headquarters and site 
organisational structures, throughout the installation lifetime. 
907. During the licensing period, and particularly the initial 
stages, there should be frequent contacts between the regulatory 
and operational organisation (and, where appropriate, the 
supporting organisations contracted to the operating organisation) 
in order to develop a mutual in-depth understanding of each others 
working arrangements and the most effective way of meeting the 
regulatory requirements. Regular meetings between senior members 
of the operating organisation/licensee and of the regulatory 
organisation should be held across the life of the installation to 
consider plant safety status issues, including those identified in 
the course of inspections. The operating organisation should be 
encouraged to regard the regulatory organisation as a valued 
source of constructive criticism and technical guidance. This can 
best be achieved by the regulatory organisation demonstrating 
consistently high standards in its assessment of safety and the 
development of nuclear regulatory criteria. 
908. Examples of liaison between the regulatory organisation and 
the operating organisation/licensee are given in Refs.l9, 20, 21 
and 22. 
LIAISON WITH EXPERT SAFETY ADVISERS 
909. As part of the arrangements for the provision of expert 
safety advice, as discussed in Section 4, a formal liaison should 
be established with the relevant advisory committees at an 
appropriately senior level within the regulatory organisation. 
This should ensure that issues raised by the advisory committees, 
or requests for information, are dealt with authoritatively. It 
should also ensure that any relevant safety related advice or 
opinion provided by the advisory committees is considered and 
disseminated to the appropriate persons within the regulatory 
organisation without undue delay. Examples of liaison with expert 
safety advisers are given in Refs.18, 19, 20 and 22. 
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LIAISON WITH THE PUBLIC 
910. It is essential that at all times the regulatory organisation 
is seen to retain its independence, including independence from 
the promotional aspects of nuclear energy, if it is to maintain 
public confidence in its regulatory activities. The development 
of both formal and informal lines of communication for the 
provision of regulatory information and advice to the public is, 
therefore, an important element in promoting and maintaining 
public confidence in the work of the regulatory organisation. 
911. Formal channels of liaison with the public can be established 
in a number of ways, including: 
- publication of information brochures on the role and 
organisation of the regulatory organisation; 
- representation on relevant national, regional or local 
advisory committees; 
- participation in public enquiries; 
- provision of information or advice in response to requests 
by members of the public through their representation at 
local, regional or national government level; and 
- publication of 
that can be 
an annual report setting out 
readily understood by the 
in a manner 
public, the 
activities and achievements of the regulatory organisation 
during the particular year, in relation to its regulatory 
objectives and criteria. 
912. Informal liaison with the public can also provide an 
effective way of presenting the regulation of nuclear safety to a 
wider audience, including those at the socio-political level, 
informed members of the public, senior schools, universities, 
local business and social organisations. This can be achieved, 
for example, by responding to requests to provide lectures and 
informal talks, 
the regulatory 
or to participate in relevant discussions. Within 
organisation, a formal channel should be 
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established for liaising with the public in response to such 
requests and for identifying appropriate speakers. Examples of 
liaison with the public are given in Refs.11, 18, 19 and 20. 
LIAISON WITH THE MEDIA 
913. Because of the size of the audience it can address at local, 
national or international level, the speed with which it can 
respond to events and the influence it can bring to bear upon 
public opinion, the media (press, radio or television) must be 
recognised as an important intermediary between the regulatory 
organisation and the public. It is essential, therefore, that all 
information provided to the media is factual, unambiguous and 
presented in a manner that can be readily understood by those 
without specialist knowledge. Provisions for effective liaison 
between the regulatory organisation and the media, at both the 
formal and informal level, are essential. 
914. Within the regulatory organisation there should be structured 
arrangements for dealing with all media related activities 
including the presentation of regulatory information for 
dissemination to the public and for responding to information 
requests. To avoid unnecessary public concern, arrangements 
should also exist for dealing with unfounded rumours; the 
development of informal contacts with media representatives can be 
of particular value in dealing with this type of situation. Those 
regulatory staff, including inspectors, who could be approached by 
members of the media in the course of their duties should receive 
appropriate training to enable them to respond more effectively. 
915. To minimise the likelihood of public statements by the 
regulatory organisation being misquoted or misconstrued, any 
formal provision of information to the media should be provided in 
the form of a written "press statement". This should set out 
briefly, and in non-technical language, the subject of the 
statement, sufficient background information to put the subject 
into context, a summary of the subject matter to which the press 
statement relates, any further actions that will result, and 
references to where more in-depth information may be found. If 
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appropriate, the statement should also indicate the time that the 
information may be released for publication. Depending upon 
national arrangements and the particular circumstances, press 
statements may be provided to the media in the course of routine 
or ad-hoc press conferences or by direct distribution to the 
relevant media outlets (press, radio and television). In the 
latter case, the urgency for releasing the information should 
dictate the particular method used (e.g. telephone, facsimile, 
telex, courier, etc.) to transmit the statement to the media. 
916. Press statements are of particular importance following any 
incident or accident at a nuclear installation, not only as a 
means of providing reassurance to the public but also for issuing 
authoritative and updated information on the situation, the 
remedial measures being implemented, and any action to be taken by 
the public. 
917. When information is presented at a press briefing, and 
particularly in the post-accident situation, simple illustrative 
diagrams or models that are readily photographed can assist the 
understanding of a complex subject. Throughout the life of the 
regulatory organisation a library of media related illustrative 
material should be developed and maintained. 
918. An example of liaison between the regulatory organisation and 
the media is given in Ref.19. 
INTERNATIONAL LIAISON 
919. The effective safe regulation of nuclear energy is of 
international concern. Ensuring that the most up-to-date safety 
principles and criteria will be satisfied is fundamental to the 
regulatory organisation's assessment, licensing and inspection 
responsibilities. It demands a multi-disciplined approach and 
cannot be 
seminars 
achieved 
and the 
in isolation. Participation in 
work of those international 
conferences, 
and inter-
governmental organisations having responsibilities for promoting 
the safe operation and regulation of nuclear energy is an 
essential mechanism for keeping the regulatory organisation 
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abreast of developments in other nuclear countries. It also 
enables the regulatory organisation to have an influence on 
standards, recommendations, procedures and guide-lines relevant to 
nuclear safety that are being developed at the international 
level. Without participation in these international activities, 
the regulatory organisation cannot expect to maintain its 
essential role in the development and implementation of an 
effective nuclear safety practice in its own country. 
920. International liaison activities of the regulatory 
organisation can be divided into three groups: 
(i) Activities that centre around the major international 
organisations such as the !AEA, the Nuclear Energy Agency of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD-NEA) and the Commission of the European Communities; 
(ii) Direct co-operative arrangements with nuclear 
regulatory organisations in other countries under formal or 
informal information exchange agreements on specified safety 
related subjects, including the exchange of technical and 
radiological data following a nuclear accident, and the 
provision of post-accident assistance; and 
(iii) Informal, ad 
regulatory staff, 
different countries. 
hoc, exchanges of information, and of 
between regulatory organisations in 
921. A summary of bilateral and multilateral agreements in the 
field of nuclear safety has been published by the !AEA (Ref.29). 
922. The activities referred to in para. 920 ( i) above include 
participation in the arrangements developed by the !AEA and the 
OECD-NEA with regard to· the Incident Reporting System ( IRS) for 
the reporting and disemination of safety related information 
relating to incidents at nuclear installations, and the 
International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) for classifying incidents 
in relation to their safety significance (Refs.30, 31). Depending 
upon national arrangements, the regulatory organisation may wish 
to act as the focal point for implementing these activities, or to 
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ensure that they are carried out by other relevant bodies, such as 
the operating organisation. 
923. In addition to the arrangements discussed in paras. 920 and 
922 above, the regulatory organisation should be able to advise on 
any Government to Government bi-lateral or multi-lateral 
agreements to which its country is party for the formal post-
accident exchange of information. This applies in particular to 
those agreements established in response to the IAEA Conventions 
on Early Notification and Mutual Emergency Assistance following a 
nuclear accident (Ref.31). 
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10. REGULATORY RESPONSE OF THE OPERATOR 
Relevant Fundamental Safety Principles: 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 15, 
16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25. 
1001. The prime responsibility for the safety of a nuclear 
installation, including any impact it may have upon workers, the 
public and the environment, rests with the operating organisation. 
An essential element of this responsibility is compliance 
throughout the lifetime of the installation with the licence 
conditions and with any other requirements that the regulatory 
organisation may consider necessary in the interests of safety. 
Determining the effectiveness with which these responsibilities 
are discharged should be an essential part of the regulatory 
organisation's on-going programme of assessment and inspection. 
The criteria that should govern the response of the operating 
organisation for meeting its regulatory commitments are summarised 
in this Section. 
ORGANISATIONAL AND SAFETY RELATED CRITERIA 
1002. Safety Policy: The operating organisation is responsible 
for establishing an effective safety policy that places highest 
priority on safety matters, and for ensuring that it is fully 
implemented. 
1003. Responsibility and Authority: The lines of responsibility 
for meeting the operating organisation's safety commitments' 
including its regulatory requirements, should be clearly defined 
and the levels of authority to which decisions of safety relevance 
must be referred should be clearly specified. 
1004. Professionally Staffed Installations: To ensure that the 
operating organisation can properly fulfil its responsibilities 
for safety, it should maintain departments of professional staff 
with design, engineering and operational expertise. 
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1005. Independent Nuclear and Radiological Safety Advice: The 
operating organisation should maintain a centralised health and 
safety department, independent from operations. This should be 
staffed and supported by safety professionals and have the 
capability for carrying out peer reviews of the operator's safety 
proposals. 
1006. Access to Management Board: On matters of urgent safety 
importance, the directors of each of the safety related 
departments should have direct access at a senior level to the 
operating organisation's board of management. 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
1007. Responding to Licensing Requirements: As part of the 
licensing procedure, the licence applicant (the operating 
organisation) is responsible for: 
- providing all information appropriate to the siting, 
design, construction, commissioning, operation, maintenance 
and decommissioning the installation, together with the 
relevant supporting safety cases and assessments, as the 
regulatory organisation may specify or request; 
- establishing proper arrangements with vendors or 
contractors to ensure that any required information is made 
available to the regulatory organisation in a timely 
manner; 
- keeping the regulatory organisation informed of any new 
information, or of alterations to any previously submitted 
information, that may be relevant to the licensing process; 
and 
- ensuring that the format and contents of documents 
submitted in support of the licensing process satisfy any 
requirements established by the regulatory organisation. 
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1008. Meeting Operational Safety Commitments: To meet its 
responsibilities for the safe operation of a nuclear installation, 
including its commissioning and decommissioning, the operating 
organisation should: 
- assure itself, and satisfy the regulatory organisation, on 
the quality of the installation as designed, constructed 
and commissioned, and that the relevant safety criteria 
have been met; 
- establish operating rules and procedures that reflect the 
design intent and safety justification of the installation, 
and that are aimed at the safe control of the installation 
under all conditions; 
- ensure that the installation is operated and maintained by 
sufficient numbers of suitably trained and authorised 
staff, and in accordance with the operating rules and 
procedures; 
establish arrangements for ensuring that there is no 
unacceptable degradation in the quality of safety 
throughout the life of the installation; 
- establish procedures for analysing the results of operating 
experience in order to improve the level of operational 
safety; 
- prepare a decommissioning programme in advance of the 
foreseen end of life of the installation, describing the 
activities to be carried out during each stage of its 
decommissioning, together with a safety justification for 
each of the activities; 
- maintain effective control over fissile and other 
radioactive materials used or generated within the nuclear 
installation; 
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- establish documented accident management and emergency 
response procedures for initiating rapid action to 
terminate safety significant incidents and accidents, for 
limiting any off-site release of radioactive materials, and 
for initiating measures for the protection of plant 
personnel and the public; 
- establish procedures for recording safety significant 
incidents and accidents and for reporting them to the 
regulatory organisation; 
- establish an adequate level of physical protection for 
controlling access to the site, and accounting for all 
persons both on the site and in areas of safety 
significance within the installation (Ref.32); and 
monitor, audit and review all safety related matters on a 
regular basis to satisfy itself, and demonstrate to the 
regulatory organisation, that the safety obligations, 
including compliance with licence conditions or any other 
statutory requirements, are being met. 
1009. It must be stressed that compliance with the requirements 
of the licensing body or the regulatory organisation, including 
any conditions attached to, or imposed in support of, the licence, 
does not relieve the licensee of his fundamental responsibility to 
protect site personnel, the public and the environment from harm. 
1010. Support Organisations: Other bodies may also have legal, 
technical or financial responsibilities with respect to the 
operating organisation, any of which may have a bearing on safety. 
For example, designers, manufacturers and constructors are 
required to meet quality standards and specifications. Although 
the operating organisation may delegate its authority to carry out 
various functions on its behalf, it cannot delegate its safety 
responsibilities. In such cases, the prime responsibility for 
safety remains with the operating organisation, which must satisfy 
itself as to the competence and safety standards of those to whom 
it contracts work. Further guidance on meeting the regulatory 
obligations of the operating organisation is given in Ref.JJ. 
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11. MAINTAINING REGULATORY EFFECTIVENESS 
1101. The previous sectio~s have set out the requirements for 
establishing an effective nuclear safety regulatory regime. 
Maintaining the effectiveness of such a regime in the longer term 
can only be achieved through constant review and critical 
appraisal of the overall regulatory objectives, and of the 
regulatory organisation's assessment, licensing and inspection 
arrangements through which they are implemented. To this end, the 
regulatory organisation should apply the principles of quality 
assurance to its own activities to ensure that its regulatory 
decisions, and the background against which they were taken, 
remain valid and are properly documented. These arrangements 
should be supported by a comprehensive programme of training aimed 
at developing all staff in their regulatory capabilities and 
keeping them abreast of international developments. 
STAFFING 
1102. In practice, the effectiveness with which the regulatory 
organisation continues to carry out its responsibilities will 
depend, to a large extent, upon the calibre and performance of its 
staff. As indicated in Section 4, it is essential that regulatory 
staff continue to command the professional respect of those they 
are required to regulate. Not only should they be suitably 
qualified, experienced and trained for the particular regulatory 
duties they are required to undertake, their level of remuneration 
should be maintained at least comparable with that received by 
their opposite numbers in the operating 1 licensee's organisation. 
Staff turnover, particularly the loss of qualified staff to other 
nuclear energy organisations, should be carefully monitored, as 
this will provide an indication as to whether the regulatory 
organisation is maintaining an adequate level of job satisfaction 
including financial reward to attract or retain suitably 
qualified regulatory staff. 
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1103. Delays in the operating organisation's or licensee's 
programme due to the need for regulatory inspection, assessment or 
the granting of approval before the programme may proceed, can 
prove expensive and frustrating, particularly if they are the 
result of an unacceptably slow regulatory process. It is 
particularly important, therefore, for the regulatory organisation 
to maintain sufficient numbers of staff, having the relevant 
qualifications, experience and training, to meet the demands 
placed upon it at all stages in the regulatory programme. To this 
end, the criteria upon which the size and structure of the 
regulatory organisation were originally determined should be 
reviewed periodically to ensure that they remain valid. 
TRAINING 
1104. It is essential for all members of the regulatory 
organisation, at all levels, to understand the organisation's 
regulatory role, legal responsibilities, and objectives, and how 
these are expected to be achieved in practice. The effectiveness 
with which this will be accomplished will depend not only upon the 
calibre, experience and qualifications of the staff recruited, but 
also on the extent to which their professional competence is 
enhanced by further appropriate training within the regulatory 
organisation. 
1105. Training Programme: At an early stage in the life of the 
regulatory organisation, an experienced staff member should be 
given the responsibility for developing and implementing a 
structured training programme based on a formal training policy 
agreed at the most senior management level. To the extent 
practicable, senior and experienced members of the regulatory 
staff should participate in the training programme, and 
particularly in the training of newly recruited staff in their 
regulatory duties and responsibilities. This should also ensure 
that senior management not only pass on their experience, but are 
also kept informed of the effectiveness of the training programme, 
and of any particular training requirements that may arise. A 
training record should be maintained for each staff member, 
indicating the date and nature of the training provided. 
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1106. Induction Training: The basic qualifications and 
experience demanded of staff joining the regulatory organisation 
should normally be dictated by the nature of the posts for which 
they are initially recruited. To provide newly recruited staff 
with a proper perspective and understanding of their role as 
regulators, the regulatory organisation should ensure that they 
participate in a structured programme of induction training. This 
should be completed within the first several months of joining the 
organisation and be sufficiently flexible to take account of an 
individual's previous background and experience. Where staff are 
recruited from the operating organisation, and particularly from a 
licensed nuclear installation, to the extent practicable, their 
induction training (and especially their on-site training) should 
not be carried out at installations with which they were 
previously associated. 
1107. Development Training: Throughout their period of 
employment, staff should be given the opportunity to retrain, as 
necessary. The basic training should also be supplemented by 
further development training appropriate to individual duties, 
needs and responsibilities. Any requirement for retraining or 
development training should be identified by supervisory staff as 
part of a periodic staff review and performance appraisal. Staff 
should also be encouraged to take advantage of the available 
training provisions. These should include a structured range of 
management training courses and be aimed both at broadening an 
individual's regulatory expertise and increasing his managerial 
skills, thereby enabling him to cover a range of responsibilities 
within any particular grade, and to improve his eligibility for 
promotion to the more senior regulatory posts. 
1108. Content of Structured Training Courses: Typical subject 
matter that could be included in a structured programme of 
induction and development training for regulatory organisation 
staff might include, as appropriate: 
Regulatory Related Courses: 
- basic introductory course on the role, responsibilities and 
working procedures of the regulatory organisation; 
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- nuclear regulatory 
legislative and 
legislation and other relevant 
administrative provisions and 
requirements; 
- law enforcement in relation to nuclear installations; 
- communication skills and information technology; 
- attachment at, 
installation; 
and/or study of, a relevant nuclear 
- simulator training (to provide an understanding of plant 
behaviour and shift operator duties) ; 
in-plant inspection training by accompanying an experienced 
inspector; 
participation in site inspection visits and preparation of 
visit reports; 
- on-site radiological protection training; 
- witnessing a site emergency exercise and participating in 
its assessment. 
- training 
regulatory 
attachments to 
organisations 
other 
and 
organisations in other countries. 
Professionally Related Courses: 
- basic radiological protection; 
- nuclear engineering; 
- nuclear safety; 
- risk assessment; 
relevant 
to nuclear 
- safety assessment criteria and techniques. 
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(non-nuclear) 
regulatory 
1109. Feedback of Review and Training Results: The on-going 
review and appraisal of the regulatory organisation's objectives 
and the arrangements by which they are met, and of the results of 
the supporting training programme, should enable any significant 
deficiencies to be identified and remedied; for example, by the 
provision of additional or specific training, or in some cases, 
the revision of particular task related procedures. The process 
provides an essential "feedback loop" for ensuring that the 
regulatory organisation not only maintains its expertise in the 
regulation of nuclear safety, but also develops it to the fullest 
possible extent. 
1110. Maintaining Professional Expertise: In addition to any 
structured programme of development training, provision should be 
made for regulatory staff to keep abreast of current thought, 
research and development within their own particular professional 
field. The regulatory organisation should provide for access to 
relevant journals, encourage active participation in the work of 
professional institutions and societies, and support attendance at 
specialist seminars and conferences. Where it is necessary to 
gain a rapid, in-depth, appreciation of a specific subject or 
problem, short attachments to an appropriate university department 
or other specialist organisation should be considered. 
1111. Participation in International Safety Developments: Active 
participation at the international level in relevant seminars, 
symposia and conventions, and as observers or experts in working 
groups, provides an important role in developing and broadening 
the experience of regulatory staff. The regulatory organisation 
should maintain a list of such meetings so that staff can be 
nominated to attend those that would be of benefit both to the 
organisation as a whole, as well as to the particular nominee. 
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APPENDIX 1 
FUNDAMENTAL SAFETY PRINCIPLES 
The Fundamental Safety Principles that support the Basic Nuclear 
Safety, Radiological Safety and Technical Safety Objectives, as 
developed by the IAEA Nuclear Safety Standards Advisory Group 
(NUSSAG) and summarised in the IAEA NUSSAG Report "The Safety of 
Nuclear Installations- Safety Fundamentals", are set out below. 
1. The government shall establish a legislative and statutory 
framework for the regulation of nuclear installations. There 
shall be a clear separation of responsibilities between the 
regulatory body and the operating organisation. 
2. The prime responsibility for safety shall be assigned to the 
operating organisation. 
3. The regulatory organisation shall be effectively independent 
from the organisation or body charged with the promotion or 
utilisation of nuclear energy. It shall have licensing, 
inspection and enforcement responsibilities and shall have 
adequate authority, competency and resources to fulfil its 
assigned responsibilities. No other responsibility shall 
jeopardise or conflict with its safety responsibility. 
4. Organizations engaged in activities important to safety shall 
establish policies that give safety matters highest priority, and 
ensure that these policies are implemented within a managerial 
structure having clear divisions of responsibility and lines of 
communication. 
5. Organizations engaged in activities important to safety shall 
establish and implement appropriate quality assurance programmes 
which extend throughout the life of the installation, from siting 
and design through to decommissioning. 
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6. Organizations engaged in activities important to safety shall 
ensure that there are sufficient numbers of adequately trained and 
authorised staff working in accordance with approved and validated 
procedures. 
7. The capabilities and limitations of human performance shall 
be taken into account at all stages in the life of the 
installation. 
8. Emergency plans for accident situations shall be prepared and 
appropriately exercised by all organizations concerned. The 
capability to implement approved emergency plans shall be in place 
before an installation commences operation. 
9. The site selection shall take into account relevant features 
which might affect the safety of the installation, or be affected 
by the installation, and the feasibility of carrying out emergency 
plans. All aspects shall be evaluated for the projected lifetime 
of the installation, and re-evaluated as necessary to ensure the 
continued safety acceptability of site related factors. 
10. The design shall ensure that the nuclear installation is 
suited for reliable, stable and easily manageable operation. The 
prime goal shall be the prevention of accidents. 
11. The design shall include the proper application of the 
defence in depth principle so that there are several levels of 
protection and multiple barriers to prevent releases of 
radioactive materials, and ensure that failures or combinations of 
failures that might lead to significant radiological consequences 
are of very low probability. 
12. Technologies incorporated in a design shall be proven by 
experience or testing or both. 
13. The systematic consideration of the man-machine interface 
and human factors shall be included in all stages of design and 
the associated development of operational requirements. 
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14. The exposure to radiation of site personnel and releases of 
radioactive materials to the environment shall be made by design 
as low as reasonably achievable. 
15. A comprehensive safety assessment and independent 
verification shall be carried out to confirm that the design of 
the installation will fulfil the safety objectives and 
requirements, before the operating organisation completes its 
submission to the regulatory body. 
16. Specific approval by the regulatory body shall be required 
before the start of normal operation based upon an appropriate 
safety analysis and a commissioning programme. The commissioning 
programme shall provide evidence that the installation as 
constructed is consistent with design and safety requirements. 
Operational procedures shall be validated to the extent 
practicable as part of the commissioning programme with the 
participation of the future operating staff. 
17. A set of operational limits and conditions derived from the 
safety analysis, tests and subsequent operational experience shall 
be defined to identify safe boundaries for operation. The safety 
analysis, operating limits and procedures shall be revised as 
necessary if the plant is modified. 
18. Operation, inspection, testing and maintenance and 
supporting functions shall be conducted by sufficient numbers of 
adequately trained and authorised personnel in accordance with 
approved procedures. 
19. Engineering and technical support, competent in all 
disciplines important for safety, shall be available throughout 
the lifetime of the installation. 
20. The operating organisation shall establish documented and 
approved procedures as a basis for operator response to 
anticipated operational occurrences and accidents. 
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21. The operating organisation shall report incidents 
significant to safety to the regulatory body. Both the operating 
organisation and the regulatory body shall establish complementary 
programmes to analyse operating experience to ensure that lessons 
are learned and acted upon. Such experience shall be shared with 
relevant national and international bodies. 
22. The generation of radioactive waste, both in activity and 
volume, shall be kept to the minimum practicable by appropriate 
design measures and operating practices. Waste treatment and 
interim storage shall be strictly controlled in a manner 
consistent with the requirements for safe final disposal. 
23. The design of an installation and the decommissioning 
programme shall take into account the need to limit exposures 
during decommissioning to as low as is reasonably achievable. 
Prior to the initiation of decommissioning activities, the 
decommissioning programme shall be approved by the regulatory 
body. 
24. The operating organisation shall verify by analysis, 
surveillance, testing and inspection that the physical state of 
the installation and its operation continue in accordance with 
operational limits, safety requirements and the safety analysis. 
25. Systematic safety reassessments of the installation in 
accordance with the regulatory requirements, shall be performed 
throughout its operational lifetime, taking into account operating 
experience and significant new safety information from all 
relevant sources. 
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